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Pakistan is building a port at the southwestern city of Gwadar on the mouth of the 
oil rich Persian Gulf. It provides an economical route for the flow of Central Asia’s 
natural resources to the world along with easy access to the growing consumer markets of 
Asia. This thesis conceptualizes the Gwadar facility as a hub port that will contribute 
significantly to the revival of Pakistan’s economy.  
China mainly funded and completed the first phase of the Gwadar port in 2005. 
Islamabad is presently negotiating with private investors for the construction of the 
second phase. This thesis demonstrates the necessity of a white paper promulgating 
policies to attract foreign investment.  
The United States and key regional players are likely to view Chinese 
involvement in the Gwadar port project with suspicion. Any potential Chinese long-term 
military presence in the region will pose complications for Pakistan. The United States 
may request military basing rights at the Gwadar port to handle some future turbulent 
situation in the region. Any such eventuality would require Pakistan to strike a difficult 
balance between a time-tested friend and an ally. Pakistan must enunciate a policy of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Pakistan is building a port at its southwestern city of Gwadar, which is located at 
the mouth of the oil rich Persian Gulf and a possible route for natural resources of Central 
Asia (see Figure 1). Islamabad is optimistic that the completion of the Gwadar port 
project would be a major step towards realizing Pakistan’s potential as a regional hub of 
trade and economic activities. The government of Pakistan’s vision is for Gwadar to be a 
link between the East and West that will change the national economy as well as the fate 
of this region.1 This vision, however, is not actively reflected in government policies. The 
port and its ancillary projects seemingly are going out of phase from each other. Where 
the first phase of the port is complete, the supporting infrastructure of railroad links, 
industrial capacity, and civic structures at Gwadar is almost non-existent. Much has been 
left wanting in the realization of this port project. Present economic policies still 
dominate the continental mindset of Pakistan’s leadership in Islamabad. The turbulent 
geostrategic situation surrounding Pakistan is also taking its toll, as favorable relations 
have not been established with neighboring countries that have a critical role to play in 
utilization of this port.  
 
Figure 1.   Geography of the Gwadar Port 
                                                 
1 President of Pakistan’s Address at the Ground-Breaking Ceremony of Gwadar Deep-Sea Port, March 
22, 2002, Hhttp://www.infopak.gov.pk/CE_Addresses/ce_gwadar.htmH (accessed April 22, 2005). 
1 
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Pakistan is presently experiencing an unprecedented upsurge in its economic 
growth and independent observers are optimistic that Pakistan’s economy is well on a 
revival path.2 How can the Gwadar port trigger Pakistan’s economic revival?  
The port project is still in its infancy and its success depends entirely on policies 
pursued by Pakistan. It requires meticulous economic planning and careful execution of 
foreign policy options. Other strategic compulsions and security concerns may 
complicate the emergence of Gwadar as a hub port. This thesis identifies areas that 
require the immediate attention of Islamabad to translate its vision of Gwadar into 
tangible economic and political gains.  
A. NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL PORT 
1. Domestic 
Sea-borne trade makes up over 10 percent of the national income for the majority 
of the world’s top economies.3 Over 80 percent of international trade, when measured in 
weight and volume, is sea-borne, and containerized freight is likely to grow to 70 percent 
of this trade by volume by 2010.4 Pakistan’s GDP increased from $28.7 billion in 1983 to 
around $70 billion in 2003, and its dependence on sea trade increased to about 95 
percent.5 The primary gateway for goods flowing across oceans remains ports. Pakistan 
presently has only two commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the Indian Ocean, 
catering largely to the domestic needs. Pakistan’s sea-borne trade in the year 2000 was 42 
million tons, and by 2015 the trade forecast is 78 million tons annually.6 Both the 
Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching their cargo handling capacity and are likely to be 
deficient in meeting future demands.  
 
2 “Exports surge as Pakistan's economy likely to grow by 6.5%,” Pakistan Times,  
Hhttp://pakistantimes.net/2004/09/12/business2.htmH, Asian Development Bank,. Pakistan Economy 
Heads for Higher Growth in 2004 and 2005, 28 April 2004, 
Hhttp://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2004/nr2004041.aspH , International Monitory Fund, Pakistan and 
the IMF, 2005, Hhttp://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/index.htmH (accessed 23 March 2005).    
3 J. R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (Maryland: Naval Institute press, 1986), 17. 
4 Sam J Tangredi, ed., Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 2002), Ch. 1, 4. 
5 Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 2003-04, 
Hhttp://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.pdfH (accessed April 4, 2005).    
6 Environment Division, Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan’s Response to Objectives of Agenda 21,” 
Hhttp://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/environment-division/media/wssd-chp1.pdfH (accessed April 11, 
2005).  
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2. Strategic  
Strategically, close proximity of both domestic ports has inherent vulnerabilities, 
making them and Pakistan more susceptible to a naval blockade. The need for an 
alternate port became apparent soon after the 1971 war when the Karachi port complex 
came under Indian missile attack. The Gwadar port, 460 kilometers away from Karachi, 
will serve as an alternate port to handle Pakistani trade in case of an emergency or 
blockade of existing ports.7  
3. Regional  
The decision to build a port at Gwadar came twenty-five years after an initial 
proposal to build a port along the Makran Coast.8 Gwadar is strategically located on the 
Indian Ocean at the crossroads of the Middle East and Central Asia, both regions that are 
rich in natural resources. The chronically disturbed geopolitical situation of the Middle 
East, coupled with world’s growing requirements of alternate energy resources, has 
captured the attention of Central Asia’s natural resources as a strategic alternative. The 
geographic location—in proximity to the crucial trade from the Persian Gulf and the 
largely untapped resources of Central Asia—has bestowed upon Pakistan one of the vital 
export corridors in the region. The Gwadar port has the potential to act as a hub port not 
only for the natural resources of Central Asia but also for trade of the entire area, which 
could translate into a desperately needed economic opportunity for Pakistan. If the 
project is well executed, the Gwadar port project could contribute significantly to the 
economic revival of Pakistan. 
B. GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES SURROUNDING THE PORT 
PROJECT  
China is helping Pakistan to build this port as well as a host of associated projects, 
such as railroad links and industrial complexes. India, Iran, and the United States have 
growing concerns about this increased Chinese presence. Regionally, India and Pakistan 
are involved in an intense security dilemma and Iran is struggling to assert its influence 
as a regional power broker. The natural resources of Central Asia can find their way to 
the Gwadar port only through Afghanistan, which has been in a state of persistent 
 
7 Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, Gwadar, 
Hhttp://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News_Event/Gawadar.htmlH (accessed April 23, 2005). 
8 U.S. Department of State memorandum s/s-7323703  6722 dated December 20, 1973.  
4 
instability for decades. An environment of suspicion has already started fermenting in 
policy-making circles of all the concerned states due to the increased Chinese presence in 
the Indian Ocean, and, if unchecked, could lead to more active competition and 
maneuvering if China does establish long-term military presence in the region.  In such 
an environment, Pakistan’s economic interests in Gwadar port are likely to be 
compromised.  
U.S. prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism and its uneven calls for 
democratization in the Muslim world have led to troubled relations with many of its 
traditional friends and allies in the Middle East. The United States is compelled to 
maintain a heavy military presence in the area in order to protect its vital national 
interests. The requirement for a new base in close proximity of the Persian Gulf may arise 
if the United States decided to re-organize its force presence in the region, with an eye of 
decreasing forces in countries with hostile populaces. In this context, one should not rule 
out the United States’ desire to have military basing rights at the Gwadar port, particular 
given a history of U.S. basing in Pakistan. This would, however, surely trigger uproar in 
Chinese circles, and Pakistan’s time tested entente cordiale and strategic partnership 
could be put to an extreme test. Additionally, such an eventuality would put Pakistan in a 
very difficult situation vis-à-vis the Middle Eastern countries. 
Pakistan must maneuver through this difficult terrain, with obstacles created by 
the war on terrorism, the persistence of the Indo-Pakistani rivalry, and Pakistan’s delicate 
political situation. This thesis examines these broader facets affecting the Gwadar port. 
This strategic context demands careful handling by Pakistan, but they must not prevent 
Pakistan from achieving the potential political and economic benefits from a future 
Gwadar hub port.  
C. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The thesis focuses on the potential of the Gwadar port to trigger an economic 
revival for Pakistan. The internal political stability of Pakistan, and particularly in the 
Balochistan province which hosts the Gwadar port, is of great importance for the success 
of the port. This subject requires exclusive treatment and, therefore, will not be addressed 
in this thesis. The thesis introduces the concept of a hub port and its economic effects in 
order to establish the broader potential of the Gwadar port. A favorable geopolitical 
5 
                                                
situation is one of the essentials for the success of the port project. The thesis will use 
theoretical tools to examine prospects for Gwadar’s success. 
A hub port collects numerous trades at a single concentrated point.9 Empirical 
studies show a positive relationship between trade and growth; and that trade has a 
quantitatively significant and positive effect on income of a nation.10 The most obvious 
explanation for the size of a country’s sea-borne trade is the size of its economy. 
Empirical studies have demonstrated that trade generally starts when the GNP of a 
country reaches approximately $17.5 billion and increases by 116,000 tons for each $1 
billion increase in GNP.11 Furthermore, the bigger the economy the greater the likelihood 
of trade generation; and Pakistan, with a GNP of over $60 billion and trade volume 
forecast of 78 million tons, has finally embarked upon a maritime venture of building a 
port at Gwadar.12 
The twenty-first century has been known as a century of globalization, and this 
has been achieved through exponential trade through sea.13 Pakistan, even in this era of 
economic globalization, has so far pursued restricted definition of maritime strategy as 
“the maritime component of national military strategy” but the time has come when top 
planners take broader definition encompassing, in addition to the traditional factor of 
“power,” factors such as “trade and access.”14  
Evidence, however, suggests that scarcities of natural resources within a country 
may provoke competition and even wars with other countries over the access to alternate 
supplies of those resources.15 Economically important resources not typically considered 
 
9 Daniel Y. Coulter, “The Rise of Hub Ports,” in Sam J. Tangredi, 133.   
10 Frankel, J. and Romer, D., “Does Trade Causes Growth?” American Economic Review, (June 
1999), 89: 379-99. 
11 Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics Second Edition (London: Routledge Press, 1997), 75. 
12 Environment Division, Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan’s Response to Objectives of Agenda 
21,” Hhttp://www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/environment-division/media/wssd-chp1.pdfH (accessed April 
11, 2005).  
13 Sam J. Tangredi, 4. 
14 James D. Watkins, “The Maritime Strategy,” supplement to U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
January 1986, 2-17, Richard Hill, “Do We Need a New Definition of Medium Maritime Power?” in 
Maritime Forces in Global Security, ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon (Halifax: Center for Foreign 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995), 38. 
15 Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence 
(San Francisco: Freeman, 1975), 283-284. 
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natural resources can be scarce and capable of generating a clash of interests and even 
provoking conflicts; specifically, the chokepoints of the world’s maritime trade routes. 
The clash of interests, primarily, is created by the desire of nations to possess a 
disproportionate share of the sea access upon which the wealth and strength of countries 
is dependent.16 Authors seem to agree on the importance of access to natural resources 
and equally importantly the alternatives. Gwadar port has the capacity to provide access 
to the vast natural resources of Central Asia as well as a route to the huge consumer 
market of Asia with one third of world’s population, putting the Gwadar port project in 
the limelight of world affairs. 
The area surrounding Gwadar port (South Asia and the Middle East) has 
historically witnessed power struggle and confrontation starting with the exploitation by 
colonial powers, and in the recent era, control by super powers to satisfy their strategic 
motives. A strategic mistrust is once again developing over the potential military use of 
this port either by China or the United States. And likely mistrust between these powers, 
on either’s desire of military presence in the port area, due to competing strategic, 
political and economic interests, is one of many impediments in realization of this port. 
Iran and India also have their own regional ambitions.  
“Reassurance” measures are therefore required to defuse suspicions about the 
perceived long-term political, military and economic objectives of all concerned states, 
particularly the United States and China.17 India and Pakistan are engaged in an intense 
“security dilemma” and to normalize relations Pakistan needs to tailor “influence” 
strategies and initiate positive engagement.18 Afghanistan is a landlocked country and 
heavily depends on Pakistan for its economic revival, in which case, despite estranged 
relations, Pakistan will have to evolve “positive incentives” to keep Kabul “engaged” in 
 
16 Alfered Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 (Boston: Little Brown, 
1890), 1. 
17 Janice Gross Stein, “Reassurance in International Conflict Management,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 3. (Autumn, 1991): 431-451 and Banning Garrett, “The need for Strategic 
Reassurance in the 21st century,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 (March 2001): 9-15. 
18 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” International 
Politics, (1976), Charles L. Glaser, “Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining 
the Spiral and Deterrence Models,” World Politics, No. 44. (July 1992)., Susan Peterson, Crisis Bargaining 
and the State: The Domestic Politics of International Conflict (An Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996), Ch. 2., George L. Alexander, “The Need for Influence Theory and Actor-Specific Behavioral 
Models of Adversaries,” Comparative Strategy, Vol, 22, No. 5 (December 2003). 
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order to ensure safe passage of natural resources of Central Asian States. Relations with 
Iran also dictate similar strategies.19  
Pakistan is in the middle of a complex strategic and security situation; only 
appropriate policies can ensure success of the port project, which is not only vital for 
Pakistan’s economic prosperity but also for security. The methodology to reach these 
policy options is enumerated in subsequent paragraphs.  
D. METHODOLOGY 
The role of ports in the economy of a nation is discussed to highlight the 
importance of an additional port for Pakistan. Pakistan’s present economic situation, with 
a particular emphasis on the role of maritime sector, forms the basis for developing this 
thesis. Gwadar port is compared with transshipment ports of Dubai and Salalah of Oman 
in terms of infrastructure and facilities in addition to domestic ports of Karachi and 
Qasim. Gwadar port is also being built to handle the flow of natural resources from 
Central Asia, in which case Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar ports of Iran are likely 
competitors; the comparison with these ports is also presented. Ports are first discussed 
individually, drawing comparisons at the end. In subsequent sections the economic 
expectations of Gwadar port and its capacity to contribute in the national economy are 
deliberated in detail. As this requires a carefully articulated package of incentives for 
potential port users as well as investors, a comparative study of economic packages 
offered by various ports are presented. Economic assumptions of the port’s success are 
trade and passage for natural resources of Central Asia and Afghanistan, handling of 
trade from Southern part of China, and act as an alternate transshipment port to other 
ports of the area; each element of these economic assumptions are evaluated to gather 
evidence in support of the economic assumptions.  
Historically the regions (the Middle East and South Asia) surrounding the Gwadar 
port have seen disturbances for several decades. Varying, and in some cases competing, 
strategic interests of various regional and global players and their linkage with the 
Gwadar Port project is discussed to establish geostrategic imperatives affecting the 
 
19 Thomas Bernauer and Dieter Ruloff, The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control (Columbia, 
SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1999)., Richard N. Haass and Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Honey, and 
Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 2000). 
8 
Gwadar port. It is focused to identify if these interests are security oriented or tied to the 
economic compulsions. This interrelation is then used to propose policy guidelines for 
the officials of the government of Pakistan.  
E. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Chapter II: Gwadar: A Hub Port 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the potential of the Gwadar port to 
become a hub port. Today’s global trade is primarily conducted through maritime means 
in which ports play a pivotal role. With mammoth increase in trade volumes and sizes of 
ships, the emphasis has shifted to the transshipment concept using hub ports as a prime 
location for loading and unloading of the goods. The dynamics of hub ports to serve the 
region and produce revenues forms the kingpin of this chapter. This leads to the 
discussion of the Gwadar port’s potential to become a hub port. The port project, along 
with its all-ancillary projects, is subsequently presented. Then, a comparison of its 
facilities with other regional transshipment ports of Dubai and Salalah of Oman is made 
to highlight potentials of Gwadar to become a hub port.  
2. Chapter III: Economic Expectations  
This chapter evaluates the economic potential of the Gwadar port. The chapter 
starts with an overview of the present status of Pakistan’s economy. An evaluation of a 
growing global need of natural resources, with particular emphasis on the resources of 
Central Asia, is presented to find their potential flow through the Gwadar port. 
Additionally, the need for another transshipment port in this area for trade of the vast 
Asian consumer market and dictates of growing domestic trade demand is used to 
establish economic expectations of this port. In the same context, economic analysis of 
the Gwadar port with its competing ports of Dubai, Salalah, Bandar Abbas and 
Chahbahar is presented, in addition to domestic ports of Karachi and Bin Qasim. The 
chapter concludes with a recommended economic incentive package for consideration of 
the government of Pakistan. The incentive package includes Free Trade Zones, tax relief, 
simplified bureaucratic procedures, assurances of investment protection, and consistency 




                                                
3. Chapter IV: Geostrategic Imperatives  
The area surrounding the Gwadar port (South Asia and the Middle East) has seen 
geostrategic turbulence more often than not, which could mar the economic realization of 
this project. Competing political, military and economic interests of regional powers, 
such as China, India and Iran, in addition to the United States, the European Union and 
Japan are elaborated to establish geostrategic imperatives surrounding the port project. 
There are growing fears of “strategic mistrust” among these powers due to potential 
military use of this port; motives of conflict and incentives of cooperation are, therefore, 
discussed for each concerned state. It is recommended that Pakistan needs to foster good 
relations with its neighbors through a proactive foreign policy and pursue a broader 
understanding with the international community. Additionally, Islamabad needs to dispel 
any notions of Gwadar port’s military use, particularly by any outside power.  
4. Chapter V: Conclusion 
This chapter summarizes major findings and conclusions about the economic 
potentials of the Gwadar port. The chapter concludes with economic and foreign policy 
recommendations for Islamabad, salient features of these recommendations are: 
a. Economic Recommendations 
One of the major conclusions of the economic part of the thesis is that the 
port and its ancillary projects should be handled as a single entity to achieve synergy of 
efforts. After synthesis of economic incentive packages and management policies of 
various ports and industrial zones around the world, particularly of Asian Tigers, a set of 
policy guidelines has been evolved for the consideration of officials handling the Gwadar 
port affairs. It is recommended to issue a white paper to convey consolidated government 
economic polices and priorities to handle the entire project.  
b. Foreign Policy Recommendations 
The prime objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to develop beneficial 
and strong ties with all major powers and maintain cordial relations with its neighbors.20 
The government of Pakistan needs to initiate extensive efforts to foster cooperation 
amongst all players and formulate policies to attract reciprocal cooperation of competing 
nations, reassure them of benign aspects of this port project and dispel notions of military 
 
20 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Foreign Policy, Hhttp://www.pakistan.gov.pk/foreignaffaris-
division/policies/pak-fpolicy/pak-fpolicy.jspH (accessed March 6, 2005).  
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use of the port by any country. Pakistan needs to reassure India and Afghanistan through 
demonstration of restraint, and “irrevocable commitment.” Iran could be won over with 
explicit declarations and through establishing “norms of competition.” As the United 
States and China are concerned, both are required to show restraint that could be in the 










21 Janice Gross Stein, 431-451. 
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II. GWADAR – A HUB PORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Foundation of Gwadar port was laid in March 2002 and its first phase was 
completed in a remarkably short duration of three years.22 Three multipurpose berths 
including all requisite cargo handling have been built in this phase. Phase two is planned 
to begin in 2005, and would completed by 2010 and add nine more berths.23 Islamabad is 
contemplating this port to become a regional hub, which would not only meet growing 
domestic requirements but also handle cargo for the entire region. This chapter evaluates 
the potential of Gwadar port to become a hub port.  
Hub port is defined as a single concentrated point for the collection of numerous 
trades.24 Empirical studies show a positive relationship between trade and growth.25 
Gwadar port is strategically located at the cross roads of natural resources of the Middle 
East and Central Asia, a huge consumer market of Asia with over one third of world 
population, and at the shortest route to the southern provinces of China. It is being 
equipped with modern cargo handling facilities to meet the challenges of growing world 
trade, which over 70 percent is conducted through containers.26 According to a UN 
estimate, world container traffic that presently stands around 300 million Twenty-Foot 
Equivalent Units (TEUs) is likely to be doubled by the year 2015.27 Economically 
booming China and India, increasingly stable Pakistan, and gradually opening consumer 
markets of Central Asia, coupled with exponential population growth in the region, will 
generate a substantial portion of world trade in near future. This thesis argues that 
Gwadar port will be able to tap its due share of trade and act as a hub port for the entire 
region. 
 
22 Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, Gwadar, 
Hhttp://www.pakboi.gov.pk/News_Event/Gawadar.htmlH (accessed April 23, 2005). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Daniel Y. Coulter, “The Rise of Hub Ports,” in Sam J. Tangredi, 133.   
25 Frankel, J. and Romer, D., 379-99. 
26 World Bank, “Review of Maritime Transport 2004,” 
Hhttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2004_en.pdfH (accessed April 12, 2005). 
27 Ibid. 
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In this chapter, after having introduced the concept of a hub port, Gwadar port 
with its ancillary projects is elaborated on. Salient features of regional hub ports of Dubai 
(UAE) and Salalah (Oman) are then discussed to draw parameters of their competition 
with Gwadar port. Besides competing for container traffic, Gwadar port is also being 
built to handle natural resources of Central Asia, for which the ports of Bandar Abbas and 
Chahbahar of Iran are possible competitors and therefore are also analyzed to draw 
similar parameters. In addition to external ports, Gwadar port is required to compete with 
domestic ports of Karachi and Qasim, which are discussed in the same context. Expected 
competition amongst these ports is deliberated to establish the potential of Gwadar port to 
become a regional hub.  
B. CONCEPT OF A HUB PORT  
1. The Theory of Hub Port 
The concept of a hub port is based on the “Hub and Spoke system,” which is a 
physical distribution system based on a "hub" moving cargo to and between several 
"spokes"28 (spokes are either smaller ports or land cargo distribution areas). As defined 
earlier, a hub port collects numerous trades at a single concentrated point and distributes 
them efficiently.  
2. Dynamics of a Hub Port 
The most important attribute carriers look for is the strategic location of the hub 
relative to primary origins and final destinations of container traffic. Beyond location, 
other attributes include the ability to safely accept large ships, extent of terminal 
facilities, efficiency of container handling operations, availability of frequent feeder 
services with an appropriate geographical coverage, and attractive cargo-handling 
charges. A transshipment hub should have terminal facilities that enable quick ship 
turnarounds. This includes adequate numbers of cranes, sufficient container 
handling/storage areas and a first-rate computer system to run the entire terminal. 
The capacity of a port may be measured by its capacity to: (a) load and unload 
ships which visit the harbor, (b) transfer cargo in and out of the port area on the land side 
and (c) store cargo within the port area. It is estimated that the poor infrastructure 
 
28 Department of Defense,  “Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Joint Publication 1-02, 
Hhttp://www.projectodyssey.com/training/glossary/glossary-h.htmlH (accessed March 29, 2005)  
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accounts for more than 40 percent of predicated transport costs; a deterioration of 
infrastructure from the median to the 75th percentile raises transport costs by 12 
percentage points and reduces trade volumes by 28 percent.29 Analysis shows that 
shipping costs reduce the rate of growth of both manufactured exports and GDP per 
capita.30 The quality of onshore infrastructure is an important determinant of transport 
costs. The obvious and most studied determinant of transport cost is geography, 
particularly distance. A 100 percent increase in distance raises maritime transport costs 
by around 20 percent. Whereas, improving port efficiency from the 25th to 75th 
percentiles reduces shipping costs by more than 12 percent.31 The evidence indicates that 
port efficiency remains the pillar of maritime trade, and hub ports are designed to operate 
at optimal efficiency thus becoming a value added organ in the economy of a state. 
3. Benefits of a Hub Status 
The most obvious benefit is the income generated from operations of a 
transshipment hub because of the double handling of containers. More importantly, 
transshipment hubs provide local importers and exporters direct access to line haul 
service, reducing transportation time (and possibly freight rates) to and from overseas 
markets. Reduced transport time directly impacts the competitiveness of exporters and 
the cost of imports, in turn creating jobs and income throughout the economy. Many 
developing countries have created free trade zones in combination with the hub port as 
engines for economic growth. Jebel Ali of UAE illustrates how a hub port in conjunction 
with an associated free trade zone can create significant economic activity. The port, 
which began operating in 1979, now has 67 berths and is serviced by 100 shipping lines. 
About 1,450 companies from 85 countries have been attracted to start up operations in 




29 Nuno Limao and Anthony J. Venables, “Infrastructure, Geographical disadvantage, transport costs 
and trade,” World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 3 (2001): 451. 
30 Radelet S. and Sachs J., “Shipping Costs, Manufactured Exports and Economic Growth,” Harvard 
Institute of International Development, 1998. 
31 Ximena Clark, David Dollar, and Alejandro Miscco, “Maritime Transport Costs and Port 
Efficiency,” a Study sponsored by World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (February 2001).  
32 Dubai Port Authority, Shipping Lines, Hhttp://www.dpa.co.ae/links/shipping_i.htmH (accessed 
April 23, 2005). 
C. GWADAR PORT 
With a population of 125,000, the Gwadar town on Makran Coast is now set on 
its way to become a hub of shipping, commercial and industrial activities. The 
construction work at the port started on March 22, 2002. The work on the first phase of 
this mega project, constructed by Chinese Harbor Engineering Company, is already 
complete. For this phase, out of a total cost of 248 million U.S. dollars, China has 
provided 198 million U.S. dollars while the Pakistan provided 50 million U.S. dollars.33 
1. Scope of Work 
The development of Gwadar Port is being undertaken in two phases (Figure 2). 
a. Phase-I34  
This phase includes construction of three berths, with a depth of 12.5 
meters, and approach channels. On commissioning, these three berths will be used for the 
loading and unloading of general cargo that may come from as far as West China, Europe 
and the American continents. In the first phase, the 602 meter long quay or jetty will 
handle up to 50,000 Deadweight Tonnage (DWT) container carriers. The designed annual 
throughput of three multi-purpose berths is 100,000 TEUs of containers, 270,000 tons of 
general cargo and 450,000 tons of bulk cargo. 
 
Figure 2.   Phases I & II of Gwadar Port35 
                                                 
33 Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, Gwadar, 




The government plans to undertake phase-II of the project as soon as 
phase-I is operational. Phase-II will be developed through the private sector on a Built 
Operate Transfer (BOT) and Built Operate Own (BOO) basis. Its extension work 
includes nine berths, including two container terminals, two dry bulk terminals, two oil 
terminals, one Roll On-Roll Off terminal, one bulk cargo terminal, one general cargo 
terminal and channel dredging 20.0 m depth with allied port facilities. The government 
has started holding negotiations with local and foreign companies to develop this phase at 
a cost of $524 million. Gwadar port, after completion of phase-II, will have capacity to 
handle vessels up to 100,000 DWT for cargo and vessels up to 200,000 DWT for oil.  
2. Port Associated Infrastructure 
While the construction work of port building is going on, a whole set of 
supporting infrastructure facilities are being laid down (Figure 3).37 The government has 
already established a Gwadar Development Authority that operates closely with the 
Gwadar Port Authority and other government agencies to synergize the completion of 
this mega project. 
 
Figure 3.   Gwadar Master Plan 
 
 
                                                 
35 Board of Investment, Government of Pakistan, “Gwadar,” 
Hhttp://www.pakboi.gov.pk/news_event/gawadar.htmlH. (accessed August 22, 2004). 
36 Ibid. 
37 “Gwadar Master Plan,” Hhttp://www.gwadarnews.com/gwadarphotos/gwadarmasterplan.jpgH 
(accessed April 4, 2005). 
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a. Transportation Links 
The Makran Coastal Highway linking Gwadar with Karachi on a 675-mile 
stretch is going to be lifeline of the Gwadar project. Completion of this highway will 
open up the area for business opportunities to domestic as well as international investors. 
It will also link Karachi with Iran and, thus, open a new and shorter trade route between 
the two countries (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.   Road Network from Gwadar 
 
The Asian Development Bank has already provided U.S. $500 million to 
build road projects, linking Pakistan’s Balochistan and Frontier provinces with 
Afghanistan and Central Asia. Road projects are, however, hitting snags due to persistent 
instability in Afghanistan and disturbed internal dynamics of Pakistan. There are also 
plans to lay a comprehensive rail link, along with a contemplated road network. This 




b. Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline38  
The long dormant project of a 1,500 kilometers long Trans-Afghan Gas 
Pipeline (TAP) from Turkmenistan to Gwadar and other parts of Pakistan that hopes to 
pump Turkmen natural gas to global markets is also poised to step off the drawing board 
after completion of the port project (Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5.   Proposed Gas & Oil Pipeline 
 
c. Upgradation of the Gwadar Airport 
Gwadar presently has a small airport that is basically meant for Fokker 
aircraft. Its expansion is already in full swing to entertain all major airlines. Oman has 
provided a grant of $7 million for this upgradation, and additionally, Rs. 563.35 million is 
being provided by the government and the Civil Aviation Authority for this purpose.  
d. Civic Amenities 
Gwadar city is being contemplated as a replica of Dubai city. The Gwadar 
master plan caters for all amenities required for a modern city and developmental work is 
already underway to ensure that necessary facilities are made available to establish the 
business and requisite housing needs.  
 
                                                 
38 Narbaev, “The Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline,” Central Asia’s Affairs, No. 1 (2004). 
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D. THE COMPETING PORTS 
1. Dubai Ports39 
Dubai Ports Authority is presently handling two major ports, Rashid and Jebel 
Ali. The Rashid port has established itself as a world-class transshipment hub serving as a 
load center for markets in the Gulf. Dubai now handles about 2.8 million TEU annually, 
about a quarter of which is transshipment traffic within the Gulf. In March 2002, Dubai 
Port Authority started construction of another port at Jebel Ali, which raised port’s 
capacity to 5.7 million TEU. Jebel Ali port is the largest man-made port. The port’s 
transshipment flows were estimated at a total of 4 million TEUs in 2002.40  
2. Salalah Port of Oman41 
This is relatively a new transshipment hub on the Arabian Sea, which established 
itself as a container terminal in November 1998. Its major advantage is proximity to the 
Europe/Asia trunk line route. It requires little diversion by line haul ships, allowing a 
quick pit stop to pick up and drop off containers for the Arabian Peninsula, Indian and 
Pakistani markets. Already, the port has drawn transshipment traffic that had previously 
been captive to Dubai and Colombo – and has also drawn some Red Sea transshipment 
traffic from Jeddah. Port’s current throughput is estimated at 1.2 million TEUs.42 The 
port can accommodate vessels up to 16m draft. The turbulent political situation of the 
Middle East is threatening to undermine its plan to snare more regional transshipment 
business. Its plan to set up a 6,000 acre free trade zone hit a major snag in 2002, when the 
major investor, Hillwood Strategic Services, an American firm, withdrew from the 
venture on the eve of signing an agreement with the government, probably due to 
geopolitical reasons.43 
3. Bandar Abbas and Chahbahar Ports of Iran44 
The Bandar Abbas port possesses 24 berths including 2 oil berths. The approach 
channel of Bandar Abbas (Shahid Rajaee) port is 6.4 kilometers long and 13 meters deep. 
 
39 Dubai Ports Authority, Hhttp://www.dpa.co.ae/H (accessed April 23 2005).   
40 Andrew Maiden, “Oman Benefits from calm waters,” Middle East, Iss. 332, (March 2003): 42.  
41 Salalah Port, Hhttp://www.salalahport.comH (accessed April 23, 2005). 
42 Andrew Maiden, 42. 
43 Andrew Maiden, 42. 
44 Ports and Shipping Organization, I. R. Iran, Hhttp://www.ir-pso.com/H (accessed April 23, 2005). 
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Only four berths are capable to handle vessels up to 100,000 DWT. Iran plans to upgrade 
facilities in Bandar Abbas to 2.6 million TEU capacity. The port is already connected by 
weekly container block trains to Tashkent (Uzbekistan) in Central Asia. The expansion of 
this port is part of the development of the Shahid Rajaee Special Economic Zone for 
which BOT industrial schemes are contemplated. The Chahbahar port has two main 
jetties, which can host only five vessels of up to 25,000 gross tonnage and draft of 11 
meters.  
4. Domestic Ports - Karachi and Qasim45 
Karachi, being the main port of Pakistan, handles over 14 million tons of liquid 
and 12 million tons of dry cargo. It has a 12 kilometer long channel and is dredged up to 
13 meters. Port Qasim is merely 56 kilometers east of Karachi and may be considered an 
extension of Karachi port complex. It has a 45 kilometer long channel and is dredged up 
to 12 meters. Karachi port has over 30 berths including three dedicated oil piers, whereas 
Qasim has only seven multipurpose berths. Karachi had been known as the gateway to 
Asia for a very long time, however, it could not translate its strategic location into a 
regional hub due to lack of domestic trade and the disturbed geopolitical situation of the 
area surrounding Pakistan. In 2004 Port Qasim handled about 16 million tons of cargo 
(0.42 million TEUs). 
E. COMPARISON OF PORTS  
Dubai, Jebel Ali and Salalah ports are well-established hub ports. Dubai’s trade 
accounts for 16.5 percent of a $20 billion economy of the UAE and these ports contribute 
significantly in the income.46 After just over four years of its establishment, Salalah port 
earned above $58 million through the transshipment business.47 The present cargo 
handling capacities of Qasim and Karachi ports are 17 million and 25 million tons per 
annum  respectively  and  are  reaching  their capacity.48 As far as Iran is concerned, both  
 
45 Karachi Port Trust, Hhttp://www.kpt.gov.pk/H , Port Qasim Authority, 
Hhttp://www.portqasim.org.pk/H (accessed April 23, 2005).  
46 Matthew Swibel, “Trading with the Enemy,” Forbes, Vol. 173, Iss. 07, (April 2004): 086.  
47 Salalah Port Annual Report 2003, Hhttp://www.salalahport.com/frame-downloads.htmH (accessed 
April 4, 2005). 
48 Government of Pakistan, “Ports in Pakistan,” Hhttp://www.pakboi.gov.pk/BFacts/ports.htmlH 
(accessed March 30, 2005).  
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ports do not have enough capacity to handle flow natural resources of Central Asia. 
Moreover, international isolation of Iran hampers port operation, as it is not open to 
international users.  
The presence of geopolitical turbulence in the Middle East and bottlenecks of 
capacity in case of domestic ports will provide opportunity for Gwadar port to attract a 
sizable share of the market and hence establish itself as a hub. A statistical comparison of 
ports mentioned in preceding paragraphs is displayed in Table 1.49 The main conclusion 
drawn from the table is that after completion of both phases Gwadar port will have 
requisite infrastructure to attract its share of business. It, however, needs to be 
appreciated that emergence of a new port would only mean a tighter competition to share 
the market. Only an appropriate set of policies, priorities and incentives would decide the 
future of the transshipment business in this area.  
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F. PARAMETERS OF COMPETITION 
There are three broad parameters on which ports compete with each other. These 
include: (1) inter-port for same trade, (2) intra-port for same markets, and (3) Intra-
Terminal for same services.50 Selection of a port is a shipper’s decision which, in 
addition to geographical location, looks for a full complement of services, including 
export packaging, warehousing and distribution, bonded operations and a Free Trade 
                                                 
49 Date gathered from official sites of respective ports. 
50 World Bank, “Port Reform Toolkit,” Module 6, 
Hhttp://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/transport/ports/toolkit/mod6.pdfH (accessed April 05, 2005).  
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Zone. Ship turn around timing is also of vital importance in their calculation. According 
to a World Bank study, port’s transportation options (directly related to ship turn around 
timings) factors 60 percent in relative importance given to the selection of a port, whereas 
port tariff structure and performance factors weigh 20 percent each.51 Gwadar port will 
have to compete with already established ports of Dubai and Salalah in addition to 
domestic ports of Karachi and Qasim to gain a competitive edge as per the above 
parameters.  
G. EXPECTED COMPETITION AMONG PORTS 
1. Hinterland Market Access 
In some situations, only one port can logically provide access to hinterland 
markets. This may result from geographical features, lack of adequate transport 
infrastructure from all but one port, political issues or other factors. Gwadar port is 
advantageously located to serve South and West Asia, Central Asia in addition to western 
provinces of China, as compared to other competitor ports.  
2. Ability to Service Transshipment Trade 
While competition for hinterland market access can sometimes be limited, 
competition for transshipment business is intense, even for ports that have already 
established leading positions as load centers. Gwadar, being outside the bottleneck of the 
Persian Gulf which is threatened from unconventional attacks in prevailing geopolitical 
situation, has an advantageous location on the Asia and Europe trade route and proximity 
to the regional origin and destination centers for and from the Arabian Sea market and 
Indian Subcontinent.  
3. Regional Port Capacity and Demand 
An imbalance of port capacity within a region will influence the level of 
competition between ports. Excess capacity will cause ports to aggressively compete for 
market share. Sometimes this can lead to destructive pricing. Gwadar port will initially be 
at a disadvantage as compared to its competitors due to lesser capacity and lack of 
demand. This could be made up for through the right set of policies and economic 
incentives to attract shipping companies initially at the cost of profit margin. 
 
 
51 World Bank, “Port Reform Toolkit,” Module 6, 
Hhttp://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/transport/ports/toolkit/mod6.pdfH (accessed April 05, 2005).      
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4. Ability to Create Competition within the Port 
The ability to segment operations in the port creates competition among port 
service providers will often determine whether competition can exist with the port itself. 
Karachi and Qasim ports are heavily influenced by bureaucratic impediments as well as 
labor unions, which affects the competition within the ports. Policy makers will have to 
take bold steps in the initial stages of Gwadar port’s operations to bring the port 
operations in line with modern management techniques, as is the case of other regional 
ports. 
5. Stakes at Risk 
The competition amongst ports is influenced by the stakes at risk in the preserving 
of market share. This takes on a particular significance in modern container ports, 
considering that the investment required to establish a new container terminal can easily 
run in millions of dollars. Whoever assumes the risk for this investment will clearly have 
a big financial stake in ensuring that the new terminal captures and preserves market 
share. The second phase of Gwadar port is being contemplated whether it should be 
handled through private sector, which will take care of this factor.  
6. Government Willingness to Cut Subsidizing Operations in Other 
Domestic Ports 
The competition between ports is sometimes influenced by the availability of 
public funds to offset losses, blurring the role of commercial forces. Governments 
sometimes subsidize ports on the basis that they are vehicles for economic growth. This 
factor is influenced more from domestic ports than the other competitors. Presently, port 
operations of Karachi and Bin Qasim ports are being subsidized in one form or another. It 
could have serious consequences on the success of the Gwadar port if policies are not 
changed for those ports.  
H. CONCLUSION 
The chapter primarily presents a structural comparison of the ports with which the 
Gwadar port is expected to compete. It is worth noting that Karachi port has two 
dedicated container terminals with a total of six berths and the Salalah port has only four 
berths dedicated for container handling. Most of the berths operated by the Dubai Ports 
Authority are oil and support berths, they however have the latest cargo handling 
equipment to manage high efficiency at the container terminals, and Dubai is the tenth 
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largest container terminal in the world. Gwadar port will start its transshipment 
operations with four container terminals with an option of converting up to seven 
general-purpose cargo terminals to container terminals. As far as Gwadar port’s 
competition with Iranian ports for flow of oil and gas is concerned, both of the Iranian 
ports are severely handicapped in terms of technology and the capacity to handle large 
ships. The port of Bandar Abbas has two oil terminals, whereas Chahbahar port has only 
two small berths. Gwadar port, after completion of the second phase, will have three 
dedicated berths to handle oil and gas. It is evident that the infrastructure being built will 
be able to meet domestic needs of the trade as well as attract sufficient trade volumes 
from other countries.  
A real opportunity exists for Pakistan to integrate its economy with the world 
markets through Gwadar port. In this regard, the priority given by Pakistan to develop the 
Gwadar port is very opportune. Gwadar port has the potential to compete with regional as 
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III. ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF GWADAR PORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The first phase of the Gwadar port, with three multipurpose berths, is complete 
and Islamabad has started negotiations with various private sector investors to start its 
second phase to add another nine berths. With a population of 125,000, Gwadar city is 
now set on its way to become a hub of shipping, commercial and industrial activities. 
Presently, Gwadar is no more than a small town surrounded by desert, the same way 
Dubai looked prior to construction of port Rashid in 1976. Pakistan plans to transform 
this city in lines with the developments at Dubai. Setting up of industrial and civic 
infrastructure from virtual non-existence dictates meticulous planning to generate enough 
trade for economic viability of the Gwadar port. The government of Pakistan, cognizant 
of the fact, has already launched various plans to develop Gwadar city to meet future 
requirements. The previous chapter evaluates potentials of the Gwadar port to become a 
hub port based on its planned infrastructure. But what is the volume of trade this port will 
be required to handle, which ultimately will translate into economic gains for the 
economy of Pakistan?  
This chapter evaluates the trade expected to flow through the Gwadar port and its 
economic benefits. The chapter begins with the present economic condition of Pakistan 
with emphasis on the role of the maritime sector, in order to establish the role that 
Gwadar port can play in the national economy. As discussed earlier, there are neither any 
industries at Gwadar nor any trade being routed through it. The volume of expected trade 
is, therefore, interpolated through economic trade trends of the areas surrounding the 
Gwadar port and evaluation of its economic potential. The envisaged trade forecast of 
Gwadar port is based on the potential cargo from Western China, Afghanistan and 
Central Asia in addition to flow of natural resources from Central Asia. The development 
of industries, trade and business in adjoining areas are some of the off spins of ports, 
which require appropriate polices to accrue maximum benefits, and are discussed in 
subsequent portions of the chapter. The chapter concludes with policy guidelines for 
Islamabad to operate the Gwadar port efficiently and manage the expected growth 
professionally to translate potentials of the Gwadar port into concrete economic gains. 
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B. ROLE OF MARITIME SECTOR IN PAKISTAN’S ECONOMY 
1. Pakistan’s Economy 
Pakistan’s economy during past fifty-five years can be described as a classic 
example of a case where artificial prosperity was maintained by heavy doses of foreign 
aid (the latest data is presented in Table 2). Easy and cheap availability of goods and 
services through foreign aid discouraged the development of a large-scale indigenous 
industry. Pakistan, after decades of dismay, has a lot to cheer on a reckonable economic 
performance as GDP growth target of 5.1 percent for financial year 2003-04 surpassed to 
5.8 percent.52 Both IMF and ADB have projected the real GDP of Pakistan to grow even 
further in 2005.53 Pakistan is on a path of economic revival and Islamabad is hopeful that 
the development of the Gwadar port will change the fate of the national economy.  
 





Aid as % of 
GNI 
Aid as % of 
gross capital 
formation 






1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 
Afghanistan  230 1285 10 46 -- -- -- -- -- -- 
India 1648 1463 2 1 0.4 0.3 1.8 1.3 2.6 1.6 
Iran 200 116 3 2 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 1.1 0.4 
Pakistan 596 2144 5 15 1.0 3.6 5.3 24.7 3.8 14.3 
Source: World Bank Economic Indicators 
2. Role of Maritime Sector  
More than 95 percent of the country’s trade is routed through the sea, which in 
2003-04 approximately amounted to 36.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).55 It is worth exploring that with such a heavy dependence on sea trade, what role 
the maritime sector plays in economy of Pakistan.  
                                                 
52 Asian Development Bank, “Pakistan Economy Heads for Higher Growth in 2004 and 2005,” 
Hhttp://www.adb.org/Documents/News/2004/nr2004041.aspH (accessed April 5, 2005).   
53 International Monitory Fund, “Pakistan and the IMF,” 
Hhttp://www.imf.org/external/country/PAK/index.htmH (accessed April 5, 2005).  
54 World Bank, “World Development Indicators database,” 
Hhttp://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.aspH (accessed May 26, 2004). 
55 Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 2003-04, 
Hhttp://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/chapters/09-trade.pdfH (accessed April 4, 2005).    
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Since its inception, Pakistan failed to pay requisite attention on its maritime 
aspect due to lack of a coherent maritime policy, unplanned ocean management system 
and inherent technological backwardness. Negligence in the field of maritime affairs is 
largely attributed to land oriented strategic compulsions.56 The major setback to 
Pakistan's maritime development has always been the lack of appreciation on the part of 
national leaders. They could only think of Pakistan’s grand strategy revolving around 
land orientation. The national planners’ continental thinking dominated by land strategy 
neglected the maritime sector, though Pakistan’s dependence on trade through the sea 
kept increasing to approximately 95 percent.  
Empirical studies show a positive relationship between trade and growth; and that 
trade has a quantitatively significant and positive effect on the income of a nation.”57 The 
twenty-first century undoubtedly is a century of globalization, made so by the easy access 
and exponential trade through the sea.58 Pakistan, even in this era of economic 
globalization, has so far pursued a rather restricted definition of maritime strategy as “the 
maritime component of national military strategy,” but the time has come when top 
planners take a rather broader definition encompassing, in addition to the traditional 
factor of “power”, factors such as “trade and access.”59 It is argued that the most obvious 
explanation for the size of a country’s sea-borne trade is the size of its economy, and the 
trade starts when the GNP of a country reaches $17.5 billion and increases by 116,000 
tons for each $1 billion increase in GNP.60 It is further contended that the bigger the 
economies the more likely they are to generate the trade; and Pakistan, with GNP over 
$60 Billion and trade volume forecast of 78 million tons, has embarked upon a maritime 
venture of building a port at Gwadar. 
Pakistan presently has two commercial ports, Karachi and Bin Qasim, in the 
Indian Ocean, catering largely to the domestic needs. About 2,000 ships, including 200 
 
56 Raja Rab Nawaz, “Maritime Strategy in Pakistan,” 
Hhttp://library.nps.navy.mil/Archimages/7229.PDFH (accessed April 22, 2005). 
57 Frankel, J. and Romer, D., 379-99. 
58 Sam J. Tangredi, 4. 
59 James D. Watkins, 2-17, Richard Hill, “Do We Need a New Definition of Medium Maritime 
Power?” in ed. Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon, 38. 
60 Martin Stopford, 75. 
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oil tankers, visit the Karachi coast every year.61 Pakistan’s sea-borne trade in year 2000 
was 42 million tons. The future trade forecast is 51 million tons per annum by 2005 and 
78 million tons per annum by the year 2015.62 The Karachi and Qasim ports are reaching 
their limit in the handling of cargo and are perceived to be deficient in meeting future 
demands. Pakistan offered the United States to finance a seaport along the Makran coast 
in 1973, which was declined. The Department of State indicated that they would not 
consider financing the port.63 Lacking a funding source, the idea was then not pursued for 
over 25 years, till Pakistan’s erstwhile friend China came forward not only to provide 
sources but also to construct the port at Gwadar. The importance of the Gwadar port 
stems from its advantageous geographical position in the Indian Ocean. 
C. TRADE EXPECTATIONS OF THE GWADAR PORT 
1. Global Trade Trends 
The United Nation’s review of Maritime Transport 2004 indicated that in 2003 
world sea-borne trade increased by 3.7 percent in response to 2.6 percent increase of 
world trade output.64 Growth of sea-borne trade at this rate resulted in an exponential 
increase in world container traffic by 9.2 percent.65 The World Bank has estimated that 
world trade would continue to grow in coming years, which means that sea-borne trade 
will increase with corresponding ratios. In terms of trade volumes, this ratio generated 
over 22.5 million TEUs.66 This excess can be imagined by the fact that this excess trade 
volume is 4 million TEUs more than the trade handled by all ports of South Asia and 
Middle East countries. Ever increasing volumes of sea-borne trade dictate extraordinary 
measures by all ports. Whereas almost all world ports are adopting measures to embrace 
themselves to handle this trade demand, there is always a limitation to the extension of 
the port capacities, for which new ports are the answer. Particularly, the mammoth trades 
 
61 Asian Development Bank, “ADB Report: ADB RETA 5974,” Hhttp://www.iczm-
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63 U.S. Department of State memorandum s/s-7323703  6722 dated 20 December 1973. 
64 World Bank, “Review of Maritime Transport 2004,” 




                                                
generated by growing China, economically stabilizing India, reviving economies of South 
Asia and the diversifying Middle East require additional ports. However, presently there 
are no other new ports being built in this area and Gwadar port has the opportunity to 
attract large trade volumes.  
In the same context, it is essential to evaluate the world’s growing energy needs. 
It is estimated that the demand of natural gas will continue to grow by 2.75 percent 
annually, whereas oil demands have remained unabated for many years.67 Energy 
demands, particularly generated by Asian countries, have resulted in skyrocketed prices 
of oil and gas. The world’s excess production capacity of natural resources is reducing 
rapidly and there is a desperate need for additional resources to be injected to meet the 
requirements of global energy markets. Natural resources of Central Asia have gained 
importance in this regard and the Gwadar port is one of the possible routes to provide 
these resources an access to world energy markets. Therefore, great volumes of trade will 
flow through the Gwadar port, generating enormous revenues that are desperately needed 
to revive Pakistan’s economy.  
2. Expected Trade – Central Asia  
Central Asia's plentiful oil and natural gas reserves have made the region an 
increasingly important area. The flow of natural resources through the Gwadar port is one 
of its main economic assumptions. The long dormant project of a 1,400 kilometer long 
Trans-Afghan Gas Pipeline (TAP) from Turkmenistan to Gwadar and other parts of 
Pakistan that hopes to pump Turkmen natural gas to global markets is poised to step off 
the drawing board after the completion of the port project. Natural resources of other 
states could also follow suit when this project is made operational. The volume of the 






67 World Bank, “Review of Maritime Transport 2004,” 
Hhttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2004_en.pdfH (accessed April 12, 2005). 
30 
Table 3. Proven Reserves, Central Asia 






Coal               
(Million Short 
Tons) 
Kazakhstan 5,417 65 37,479 
Kyrgyzstan 40 0.2 895 
Tajikistan 12 0.2 Minimal 
Turkmenistan 546 101 Minimal 
Uzbekistan 594 66.2 Minimal 
Total 6,609 232.6 38,374 
Source: Energy Information Administration.68 
The total population of the Central Asian State is around 65 million, which is 
distributed amongst six states, out of which Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are 
located comparatively away from Pakistan.69 It is expected that only a small quantity of 
cargo from these states may find its way to the Gwadar port. The other three states, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, due to close geographical proximity, will be 
the potential users of the Gwadar port. The present total foreign trade of the area is 
estimated to be $20 billion, with $12 billion of exports.70 The total international trade of 
the region in terms of weight and volume is approximately 80 million tons.71 All kinds of 
consumer goods, electronic items and garments are imported by these countries, which 
ought to flow through a seaport. Whereas exports, which could find their way through the 
Gwadar port, include cotton, metal ores, machinery, gas and oil.  
The road distance from Kushka in Turkmenistan to Gwadar is only twelve 
hundred kilometers; whereas, the nearest Black Sea port of Odessa in the Ukraine is 
approximately three thousand and four hundred kilometers away from Central Asian 
States.72  Therefore,  Gwadar  is  the most viable option available with the CARs. A 500- 
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kilometer long highway connecting Gwadar via Panjgur, Chaghi and Rabat, up to Herat 
in Eastern Afghanistan is already being planned, which would directly link Gwadar to 
Central Asia. 
It is even reasonable to assume that, once this road link is established, trade as far 
as from Russia could also find its way through the Gwadar port. This route is expected to 
offer quicker and cheaper transportation than the primary alternative – the shipment of 
goods from South Asia through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean and then into the 
Atlantic and North Sea to Baltic ports. Russian analysts predict that delivery time using 
such a route will be reduced by up to 20 days, and the cost per container will decrease by 
$400 to $500.73  
3. Expected Trade –China  
Another vital country is China, an economic giant of the region. The trade 
prospects with China are envisaged to evolve along with the construction of the port. 
Being a coastal region, the eastern part of China is far more developed than the western 
part. China triggered the western development strategy in the late 1990s and the western 
region has drawn the attention of eastern region due to its cheaper labour force, rich 
natural resources and potential huge market. The southern tip of the huge Xinjiang 
province is 4,500 kilometers from Chinese ports located on the eastern coast, but only 
about 2,500 kilometers from the Gwadar port.74 It is expected that China’s use of the 
Gwadar port for exports originating from the western region will provide her preferred 
option. Thus, it may be logically visualized that the Gwadar port will be an integral part 
of China’s Foreign Trade route in future. The existing Karakoram highway already 
connects western China to Pakistan. With further expansion and upgrading of this traffic 
artery and proposed linkages to Gwadar via planned Ratodero - Khuzdar road, shall make 
it the shortest and viable route connecting Gwadar to Western China. 
4. Expected Trade – Afghanistan  
Afghanistan, after being placed on a path of development, is in desperate need of 
finding new avenues for boosting its economy. The country is full of natural resources, 
among them are the world’s largest deposits of copper and large deposits of high grade  
73 Gordon Feller, “Trade Route of the Future,” Journal of Commerce, (May 26, 2003): 1. 
74 M. Aftab, “Will Gwadar be a ‘paradise’ for investors,” Khaleej Times, April 1, 2002, 
Hhttp://www.khaleejtimes.co.ae/ktarchive/010402/finance.htmH (accessed April 23, 2005). 
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iron ore. Besides this, the country possesses reserves of oil, gas, coal and precious stones. 
Once the conditions in Afghanistan become conducive to full exploitation of this 
productive potential, it will trigger a formidable momentum of trade activity, which 
would need operationally feasible and economically viable sea trade routes.75 Another 
important fact is the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline (TAP). This project, carrying 30 billion 
cubic meters of gas per annum from Turkmenistan’s gas fields to Gwadar, will be the 
first step towards its perceived economic benefits. This 1,500 km pipeline project can 
yield significant revenues as Pakistan has plans to build a liquid-gas plant at the Gwadar 
port for export purposes.  
5. Expected Trade – Domestic 
The development of the Gwadar port will play an incentive role in changing the 
economic destiny of the country in general, and the Balochistan province in particular. 
Large volumes of trade are expected after the establishment of industries at Gwadar and 
the surrounding area. The government has already planned an Export Processing Zone, 
declaring it as a Tax Free Zone.76 With the completion of a coastal highway, a sizable 
volume of trade from Pakistan’s other industrial areas is also likely to flow through the 
Gwadar port, especially while both existing ports are reaching their capacity to meet the 
needs of domestic trade. The estimated cargo handling of Gwadar port, based on future 
prospects, till year 2015 is as shown in Table 4. 
 
75 Energy Information Administration, Afghanistan Country Analysis Brief, June 2004, 
Hhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/afghan.pdfH (accessed April 23, 2005).   
76 Reporter, “Incentives for economic zone at Gwadar sought,”  The Dawn, Mar. 19, 2005, 
Hhttp://www.dawn.com/2005/03/19/ebr4.htmH (accessed April 23, 2005). 
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Table 4. Gwadar’s Trade Forecast 
Year  
Category 2005 2010 2015 
Dry Cargo (million tones) 3.96 4.74 5.77 
Liquid Cargo (million tones) 16.62 17.54 18.77 
Container (1000 TEUs) 200 241 295 
Transshipment (1000 TEUs) 200 250 300 
Source: Board of Investment – Government of Pakistan.77 
 
Additionally, Balochistan has abundant mineral resources, which could not be 
exploited earlier, mainly due to a poor communication infrastructure. The development of 
roads due to increased economic activity in the province will play a vital role towards the 
development of an otherwise barren province. A welcome spin off of the Gwadar port is 
the renewal of Saindak project. This project aims at the production of gold and blister 
copper, which fetched more than 140 million rupees in foreign exchange during a trial 
production in 1995.78 With this project becoming operational, Pakistan would be 
producing 45,000 tons of copper along with various associated metals, which besides 
meeting domestic requirement, will be exported through the Gwadar port and earn a 
substantial amount of foreign exchange. 
Fishery is an avenue that is providing employment to 300,000 fishermen that is in 
addition to 400,000 attached to its ancillary industries. The Karachi fish harbor handles 
90 percent fish and seafood catches and earns $120 million in export. Contribution of 
fishery in the country’s earnings is displayed in Figure 6.79 It is anticipated that with the 
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construction of Gwadar port, there would be a marked improvement in fish and seafood 
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ent of the port will also bring in its wake industrial development, 
cial uplift of immediate and adjoining areas. Gwadar is an unexplored 
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Table 5. Industrial Potentials at Gwadar 
1. High technology and heavy 
industries. 
13. Shrimp farming, Shrimp 
/Lobsters. 
2. Fish Processing & Crabs 
processing. 
14. Training services in Fisheries 
and Aquaculture. 
3. Cold storages, Ice factories. 15. Port Management projects. 
 
4. Seawater Reverse Osmosis 
Desalination Plants for profitable 
purpose. 
16. Hotels Restaurants & Resorts. 
 
5. Business Development 17. Date Processing. 
6. Service Providers 18. Canned food, Gravel Crush 
plant 
7. Oil Palm cultivation. 19. Water sports center and 
recreation facilities. 
8. Marine & Automobile repair 
workshop. 
20. IT Related industries. 




10. Clearing & Forwarding agency. 22. Boat building & naval 
architecture institute. 
11. Hospitals & Clinics. 23. Oil Storage tankers. 
12. Re-rolling Mills. 24. Ferry Service for Karachi, 
Ormara-Pasni- Gwadar and up to 
Oman and Dubai. 
 
D. ECONOMIC EXPECTATIONS OF GWADAR PORT 
Running a port used to mean serving the import and export needs of a well 
defined hinterland, like Pakistan’s domestic ports have traditionally been doing. 
Pakistan’s decision to build the Gwadar port was driven by the projected requirements of 
trade, expanding requirements of transshipment ports, and most importantly, global lust 
for a strategic alternate to natural resources. The Gwadar port is being build to handle not 
only domestic trade, but to act as a transshipment port, which besides boosting trade 
volume generates additional revenue just by handling some one else’s trade. 
It is worth noting that for a majority of the world’s top economies, sea-borne 
exports alone make up over 10 percent of the national income.81 Hong Kong’s port 
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contributed over 20 percent82 of the country’s total 161.5 Billion Dollar83 GDP in 2002, 
and Dubai’s trade was 16.5 percent of a $20 billion economy.84 The port of Salalah, 
which started just five years back, broke the world record twice for the number of 
container moves achieved per hour and is now earning over $58 million through handling 
of transshipment trade.85  
In the Soviet era, millions of tons of cargo a year passed from Europe to Iran via 
the Soviet Union and India. If revitalized, this corridor is likely to generate around 15-20 
million tons of freight annually, and annual trade worth $10 billion, and the Gwadar port 
is suitably located to attract this trade.86 In addition to revenue generated through port 
operations, toll collection will be another venue for resources. According to one estimate, 
border-crossing costs vary between 10 and 15 percent of the goods’ value in case of road 
transport, and 2 to 10 percent for rail transports.87 In terms of TEU per kilometer the cost 
to transport is around $1 per TEU.88 The flow of 10-15 million tons of Central Asian 
trade would generate millions of dollars per year in taxes and services. Large volumes of 
trade from western provinces of China are also expected to be routed through the Gwadar 
port, generating similar amounts of revenue.  
A World Bank study indicated that even the services sector of ports have the 
capacity to generate around $60 billion a year.89 The World Bank also estimates that 
Asian countries need to invest $600 billion over the coming decade to meet their energy 
needs. Development of the Gwadar port is one such venture to provide access to energy 
resources of Central Asia; perhaps this is the reason that China is the major investor in 
 
82 Bureau Report, “India must emulate China ports model,” The Hindu Business Line September 18, 
2002.  
83 World Bank, “World Development Indicators - April 2004,” 
Hhttp://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.aspH (accessed May 26, 2004)   
84 Matthew Swibel, “Trading with the Enemy,” Forbes, Vol. 173, Iss. 7 (April 12, 2004): 086.  
85 “Salalah Port - Milestones,” Hhttp://www.salalahport.com/frame-intro.htmH (accessed April 4, 
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86 Gordon Feller, 1.   
87 World Bank, “Review of Maritime Transport 2004,” 
Hhttp://www.unctad.org/en/docs/rmt2004_en.pdfH (accessed April 12, 2005). 
88 Ibid. 
89 World Bank, “World Bank Port Reform Tool Kit,” 
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the first phase of the port. The second phase of the port is planned to be built through 
private investors and is likely to attract major investments.90  
The Gwadar port will bring an industrial revolution in the area and generate 
thousands of jobs. A large support and services setup will also evolve along the entire 
path of trade flow, generating income opportunities for a large population. In countries 
like Pakistan, a single job is the means of living of entire families of average 4-5 family 
members, which would translate into income for millions of Pakistanis. Another facet of 
this development is the demographic change that would occur at Gwadar and its 
surrounding areas, relieving population loads at major cities like Karachi. It is a basic fact 
that the coastal areas achieve faster growth than do the inland areas, even in the same 
country; Gwadar would not be a different story.91  
As discussed earlier, the Gwadar port is still in its infancy and only assumptions 
can be made to establish the volumes of trade expected to flow through the port and 
corresponding revenue generation. The interpolation of above estimates suggests that the 
Gwadar port has the potential to attract great volumes of trade, generate thousands of jobs 
and gather significant revenues. Given the potential, it is confidently argued that the 
Gwadar port will help to revive the economy of Pakistan. Translation of this potential 
into economic gains dictates that the port and its ancillary projects are handled 
professionally through carefully articulated policies.  
E. POLICY GUIDELINES  
Running a port used to mean serving the import and export needs of a well 
defined hinterland; this concept, however, changed long ago with the introduction of 
containerization and establishment of hub ports. Not realizing the revolutionary changes 
in the maritime sector, Pakistan treated existing ports of Karachi and Qasim as the only 
places for loading and unloading of cargo. In this era of globalization, the ports have 
increasingly become a node for economic integration and ports act as maritime logistic 
centers, which engulf much larger aspects of business and industry. At present, over 
thirteen different ministries handle maritime affairs of Pakistan. A paradigm shift is 
 
90 World Bank, “World Bank Port Reform Tool Kit,” 
Hhttp://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/transport/ports/toolkit.htmH (accessed August 22, 2004). 
91 Jeffrey Sachs, “The Limits of Convergence: Nature, Nurture, and Growth,” The Economist (14 June 
1997): 19.  
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required in policy-making circles of Islamabad to treat the Gwadar port, its associated 
projects as well as the industrial and civic projects at Gwadar city, as a single entity to 
ensure coherence and coordination of all governmental policies. A sovereign board of 
governors that includes government as well as private sector representatives is considered 
the best option to formulate long term plans and overview their implementation.  
The government of Pakistan has already declared that the second phase of the port 
will be built through private sector participation; it remains to be seen how the port will 
be operated. There are four basic port management models that involve public and private 
sectors to varying degrees (see Table 5). Both of Pakistan’s domestic ports fall under the 
“public service” category. Their efficiency has mostly remained sub-optimal and 
participation in the national economy minimal. Both ports also suffer due to complex 
bureaucratic channels and in the hands of politicized labor unions.  
 
Table 6. Basic Port Management Models92 
Type of Port Infrastructure Superstructure Port Labor Other 
Functions 
Public Service Public Public Public Majority 
Public 
Tool Port Public Public Private Public/Private 
Landlord Port Public Private Private Public/Private 
Private 
Service 
Private Private Private Private 
 
The first phase of the Gwadar port has provided basic infrastructure through 
public sources and the private sector is being involved for building the infrastructure in 
the second phase. In line with current business trends, motivation to bring in the private 
sector is to increase efficiency and lower the burden on the public sector. Most of the 
world ports are presently being managed through private sector enterprises, which have 
evolved through networking of ports and the shipping industry under their control. The 
best part being that once they are involved in the management of a port, revenue and 
efficiency aspects are taken care of. The Karachi port is already operating a container 
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terminal through the private sector. In order to attract major investments from the private 
sector, the government needs to allow their greater role as well. Therefore, the best option 
for management of the Gwadar port project is through the concept of a landlord port.  
Notwithstanding the importance of the private sector, major policies and 
regulations would still be required from the government. As far as monitoring and 
provision of a competitive and conducive environment are concerned, regulations may 
enhance port efficiency while excess regulations result in bureaucratic hurdles and 
discourage private sector participation. Minimal government intervention in the day to 
day routine of the port affairs is therefore recommended.  
Today’s businesses demand transparent, competitive and long-term policies. 
Pakistan’s government officials have occasionally announced special economic measures 
for Gwadar, including the declaration of Gwadar as a Special Economic Zone and tax 
holidays of up to seven years. However, so far there is no single document dealing with 
the port, its ancillary projects, and establishment of trade and industry in the area. As the 
first phase of the port is already complete, in order to show the government’s resolve and 
commitment, Islamabad needs to issue a white paper containing all the policies related to 
the port operations as well as establishment of the business in the area.  
F. CONCLUSION  
Economy is an essential element of national power and is fundamental to the 
strength and stability of a country. The Gwadar port will attract investors, create job 
opportunities, and open up new vistas of economic development in the coastal region and 
add significant revenues in national economy. The port also comes as a much-needed 
national requirement in the wake of the rise in cargo traffic at existing ports. More 
importantly, other development projects, for example, the Makran coastal highway, 
industrial estates in the region, and the Saindak project, are a few of the welcome spin 
offs of the Gwadar project. Besides the economic gains, substantial political benefits can 
be accrued from providing seaport facilities to the regional countries, especially land 
locked states. 
Although there is an enormous quantum of trade that could flow through the 
Gwadar port, it is also faced with the tough and challenging task of competing with 
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developed ports of the region. Concerted efforts are required for creating conducive 
environment for the industrialization of this region based on strategies, program and 
scientific approach and efficient directions to make it a comprehensive and competitive 
project. It is, therefore, recommended that Islamabad should issue a white paper 

































IV. GEOSTRATEGIC IMPERATIVES OF THE GWADAR PORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
China is helping Pakistan to build this port as well as a host of associated projects 
such as railroad links, industrial complexes etc. India and Iran are raising eyebrows over 
the increased Chinese presence, which is also attracting the attention of the United States. 
Regionally, India and Pakistan are involved in an intense security dilemma and Iran is 
struggling to assert its influence as a regional power broker. Natural resources of Central 
Asia can only find their way to the Gwadar port through Afghanistan, which is in a state 
of persistent instability since many decades ago. An environment of suspicion has already 
started fermenting in policy making circles of all the concerned states due to increased 
Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, and it could particularly blow out of proportion if 
it turns out to be a prelude to a military presence.  
In the aftermath of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), stemming from 
September 11 incidents involving a majority of the terrorists from Middle Eastern 
countries and their heavy crackdown, American support is dwindling in the Middle 
Eastern countries. The United States, due to its strategic interests in the area, is 
maintaining a heavy military presence in the area. The requirement of a base in close 
proximity of the Persian Gulf may arise if the United States decided to pull out its forces 
from the Middle East. In this context, one would not rule out the United States’ desire to 
have military basing rights at the Gwadar port, as there are abundant occasions of 
extending such facilities by Islamabad in the past. This would, however, surely trigger an 
uproar in Chinese circles and Pakistan’s time tested entente cordiale and strategic 
partnership could be put to an extreme test. Additionally, such an eventuality will put 
Pakistan in a very odd situation vis-à-vis Middle Eastern countries. 
What policies should Pakistan formulate to attract the cooperation of competing 
nations and dispel notions of strategic mistrust amongst these nations? Success of the port 
project is essential for the growth of Pakistan’s economy. The GWOT, lack of thaw 
between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s delicate internal political situation are some 
of the facets affecting the Gwadar port, and they demand careful handling by Pakistan.  
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This thesis argues that “reassurance” measures are required to defuse suspicions 
about the perceived long-term political, military and economic objectives of all 
concerned states, particularly the United States and China.93 India and Pakistan are 
engraved in an intense “security dilemma” and to normalize relations Pakistan needs to 
tailor “influence” strategies and initiate positive engagement.94 Afghanistan is a 
landlocked country and heavily depends on Pakistan for its economic revival. Pakistan, 
despite estranged relations, will have to evolve “positive incentives” to keep Kabul 
“engaged” in order to ensure the safe passage of natural resources of Central Asian 
States. Relations with Iran also dictate similar strategies.95  
Pakistan is in middle of a complex strategic and security situation; only 
appropriate policies can ensure the success of the port project, which is not only vital for 
Pakistan’s economic prosperity, but also for security. The chapter will, therefore, be 
structured to evaluate the strategic environment surrounding Pakistan, highlighting 
interests of various regional and global players concerned with the port project. In the 
conclusion, this thesis will draw common points evolved from the discussion of interests 
of these states in order to recommend policy options for Islamabad.  
B. STRATEGIC SITUATION OF PAKISTAN  
President Clinton, during his trip to the region in the year 2000, explained the 
strategic situation of South Asia by declaring it as “the most dangerous place on earth,”96 
and the world witnessed two nuclear states, India and Pakistan, eyeball-to-eyeball with 
military machines ready to pull triggers during 2002. Historian Daniel Moran suggested 
that South Asia would see more than their share of irredentist and secessionist wars, 
arising in part from conditions that European imperialism created and left unresolved; 
and India and Pakistan have already fought three wars.97 Throughout South Asia, the 
 
93 Janice Gross Stein, 431-451, and Banning Garrett, 9-15. 
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97 Daniel Moran, Wars of National Liberation (London: Cassell, 2001), 131. 
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search for prosperity is too often overshadowed by the specter of war.98 The situation on 
the western side, though less grave, is no different than the east. Pakistan’s desire to 
maintain safe borders in the west have often been met by a checkered response by 
Afghanistan in the name of the Durand Line controversy and Pushtoonistan issues, and 
by Iran due to Pakistan’s relations with the United States and Middle Eastern countries. 
Pakistan’s role in the recent Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has made these relations 
more precarious. 
Additionally, the perception of an increased Chinese presence due to the Gwadar 
port has added a new dimension to the complexity of the security situation for Islamabad. 
Not to exclude prospects of the United States, dismayed from increasingly uncomfortable 
presence in the Middle East, requesting basing rights from its present “front line state” 
(which has historically provided such facilities to the United States) at the port; inviting 
uproar within Chinese circles as well as putting Islamabad in very odd situation vis-à-vis 
Middle Eastern countries. Conversely, the Chinese decision to increase military presence 
to safeguard its interests in the area could trigger an unending spiral of security issues, 
replicating a Cold War situation. 
In this complex geostrategic situation there is optimism for the port’s success. 
This thesis argues that it was basically the logic of economic interests that brought the 
international community into broad-based, deep and mutually beneficial relationships at 
the dawn of the new millennium. In the twenty-first century, the International institutions 
have the capacity to enhance the prospects for cooperation among states and even hard 
core realist Mearsheimer admitted that the prospects for cooperation are abundant in this 
promising new world.99 And major sea powers, capable of disrupting the Sea Lanes of 
Communication (SLOCs), have agreed that the Indian Ocean should remain peaceful.100 
It is, therefore, hoped that the military deglobalization brought about by the end of the 
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Cold War will help defuse the volatile situation surrounding a project which not only can 
benefit Pakistan, but the whole world. 
Intra-regional disputes, the arms race and the absence of spirit of mutual co-
existence among the littoral states have encouraged the outside powers to manipulate the 
littoral weaknesses and create dissention in their ranks. Big powers have always tried to 
maximize their influence in the littoral states by applying the tactics of diplomacy, 
maritime bases and naval forces to make use of vast concentration of resources. In this 
perspective it will be prudent to analyze the regional politico-economic interest of 
regional and extra regional powers. General interests of concerned countries will precede 
their points of contention in order to evaluate if the Gwadar port can help convert 
contentions into cooperation and help Pakistan evolve a strategy to foster this 
cooperation.  
C. INTERESTS, INTERRELATION & CONFLICTS OF REGIONAL AND 
EXTRA REGIONAL POWERS 
1. Pakistan’s Interests in the Region  
Pakistan has a strategic location in the Indian Ocean region. On the west is Iran, 
which has traditionally been a close ally. On the east is India, which is seen as a potential 
adversary. In the north is China, which has been a close friend, and to the northwest is 
Afghanistan, which is likely to remain friendly towards Pakistan because of her geo-
economic compulsions. On the other hand, Pakistan is also located strategically in the 
vicinity of the Persian Gulf and acquires a special significance as nearly 17 million 
barrels of oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily.101 About 90 percent of 
Pakistan’s trade is sea-borne and its SLOCs are passing through the Indian Ocean.102 
Development of a commercial port at Gwadar on the northern extremities is another 
important factor for Pakistan’s interest in the region.  
Economic dependence of Pakistan on sea routes for trade and commerce is of 
cardinal importance for the country’s survival as an independent sovereign nation. The 
importance of the coast of Balochistan (where the Gwadar port is being made) was 
 
101 Dr Moonis Ahmer, ”Indian Ocean: Maritime Security and Confidence Building,” Indian Ocean   
Security and Stability in the Post-Cold war Era, (1995): 264. 
102 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, “Pakistan’s Maritime interests and Policy,” Indian Ocean Security and 
Stability in the Post-Cold War Era, (1995): 189. 
45 
                                                
realized by the CIA in the 1980s citing “its strategic location near oil routes from the 
Persian Gulf.”103 Soviets, prior to breakup, for a long time had desired expansion towards 
the warm waters of the Arabian Sea.104 Pakistan and Iran had also long believed that the 
USSR hoped to gain warm water ports and the same is manifested in assessments of the 
CIA.105 A time has come where chairman of the Gwadar Port Authority, Rear Admiral 
Sarfraz Khan, said, “It was a long-standing desire of these states to reach warm waters 
and now we have ourselves offered this opportunity to them.”106 
In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the 
political map of the region is being reshaped and new political trends are emerging. The 
United States, China and India are flexing their muscles to enhance their influence in the 
area. The United States and Pakistan’s relationship has been like a roller-coaster ride, 
marked by alliance and close partnership during the Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan 
Administrations and cool or tense relations when Kennedy, Johnson, Carter and Clinton 
occupied the White House.107 This long and checkered relationship has its roots in the 
Cold War and South Asian regional politics of the 1950s.108 Present dictates of the 
GWOT have once again brought Pakistan back in the camp of the United States. 
China’s relations with Pakistan are the strongest in the Indian Ocean region. And 
from Pakistan’s side President Musharraf reiterated the historical bond by saying that 
“China has been our most consistent ally over the past 30 years,” adding “Washington’s 
interest is likely to diminish.”109 Pakistan, with antagonistic relations with India, actually 
sought a powerful ally to keep Indian attempts of regional hegemony at bay.  
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In the recent past, India and Pakistan have entered into a “composite dialogue” 
and there is a reasonable optimism that even if longstanding disputes like Kashmir and 
Siachean are not resolved, a working relationship could be established for the collective 
good of the people. Iran, India and Pakistan are working closely to strike a deal over a 
gas and oil pipeline from Iran to India through Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani authorities 
are also endeavoring to materialize Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP), which 
would terminate in India and would go even beyond.  
Optimism thus exists to foster economic cooperation amongst all concerned states 
and the Gwadar port can provide common ground in this regard. Interest and response of 
the United States’ in the port project will have far reaching affects in both its 
operationalization as well as the stabilization of the strategic situation in the area, which 
are discussed in ensuing paragraphs.  
2. United States Interests  
Can the Gwadar port project harness enough United States attention to stimulate 
its interest in keeping the region stable? Substantially improved capacity of the United 
States to project power confirms her intentions to take a more active role in the affairs of 
this region. Although the termination of the Cold War ended a pretext of heavy U.S. 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean, American policy makers were still “preparing for two 
major theater wars (MTWs) in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf.”110 That is why, in 
May 1997, in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Navy retained its 12 Carrier 
Battle Groups and 12 Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). U.S. academia has its own 
ambitions, Koburger, Jr., in his book Sea Power in the Twenty-First Century, projected 
that by 2021, the U.S. Navy should have 7 super carriers plus reserves and a sealift 
capability of 12 Marine Expeditionary Units.111 The United States has an interest in 
keeping the oceans open to all, which is evident from the presence of, at the minimum, 
U.S. Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf since 1949.112  
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In 1992, the Pentagon drafted a new grand strategy designed to preserve 
unipolarity by preventing the emergence of a global rival.113 Although the strategy never 
saw approval at the time due to severe internal resistance, it did generate discussions 
across the board by academia as well as different states. The focus being, is the unipolar 
world stable?114 Interest in this discussion is to elucidate the United States’ role in the 
Indian Ocean. Charles Krauthammer argued that unipolarity is durable and peaceful, but 
the chief threat is the United States’ failure to do enough.115 What is the United States 
required to do in this area and why? It is talked about more often than not that China and 
the United States are destined to be adversaries as China’s power grows.116 Both states so 
far, however, have shown restraint and avoided situations that can destabilize the area.  
In the Middle East, the United States’ main ally, Saudi Arabia, has 261 billion 
barrels of proven oil reserves (more than one-fourth of the world total) and up to 1 trillion 
barrels of ultimately recoverable oil.117 Shortly after the Arab oil embargo in 1973-74, 
the United States (and other Western countries) created the Strategic Petroleum Reserves 
(SPR) as the nation’s first line of defense in case of an oil crisis. In November 2001, 
President Bush made an unprecedented decision to fill the SPR to its full capacity of 700 
million barrels.118 And in 2001, the United States imported 54 percent of its oil 
requirements, out of which 30 percent came from the Persian Gulf region.119 The United 
States economic prosperity and strategic security, therefore, depends on an uninterrupted 
supply of oil.  
The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States by militant Muslims, 
predominantly Saudis, have created a significant challenge to the long-term partnership 
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between Washington and Riyadh.120 Trickling control over the Middle Eastern region 
would also mean loosening its grip over the dynamics of the region. For this reason, the 
United States desires a strategic alternative of Middle Eastern oil, and natural resources 
of CARs are bound to become a strategic alternate of the U.S. oil supply. Pakistan’s 
Gwadar port is one of the probable sites to provide an outlet to CARs natural resources, 
via Afghanistan. Only a few days before the September 11 attack, the U.S. Energy 
Information Administration documented Afghanistan’s strategic “geographical position 
as a potential transit route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian 
Sea.121 American intervention into Afghanistan in pursuit of suspected terrorists has only 
further complicated an already delicate regional balance. Hopes of keeping economic 
interests alive nevertheless remained alive even after U.S. operations in Afghanistan, as 
the New York Times reported on December 15, 2002 that, “The State Department is 
exploring the potential for post-Taliban energy projects in the region.”122 The future of 
Afghanistan will determine the future of United States influence over the routing of CAR 
resources through this area. Circumstances after the unfortunate September 11 attacks not 
only brought an ‘old ally’ (Pakistan) back into its camp, but also suited its alternate 
strategic oil supply plans. Although a reasonable portion of U.S. oil tycoons support 
CARs oil supply through Iran, the policy goals oppose the building of a pipeline that 
transits “energy competitor” Iran, or otherwise gives it undue influence over the 
region.123  
Desire for a strategic alternate of oil aside, the indications of wearing American 
commitment in the Middle East does not necessarily indicate lowering of its resolve in 
the area as the Pentagon is becoming increasingly interested in the concept of mobile 
offshore bases for deployment in the Persian Gulf, to ensure the U.S. military access to 
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critical regions in the future.124 Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas are, therefore, likely 
to remain the priority of United States policy makers for the foreseeable future. Naval 
presence is likely to increase even further due to increased discontentment in Middle 
Eastern countries and declining acceptance of U.S. ground forces. This presence will 
have a direct bearing on the Gwadar port project, and it ought to have positive effects. 
In the same context, one would not rule out the United States’ desire to have 
military basing rights at the Gwadar port, as there are abundant occasions of extending 
such facilities by Islamabad. This would, however, surely trigger an uproar in Chinese 
circles and Pakistan’s time tested entente cordiale and strategic partnership could be put 
to an extreme test. Additionally, such an eventuality will put Pakistan in very odd 
situation vis-à-vis Middle Eastern countries. Chinese probable response to such a request 
will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs under the heading of Chinese interest in the 
area.  
Next, one would discuss Washington’s potential response if China increases its 
military presence in the Indian Ocean. The United States’ view of the threat and the 
stakes in the India Ocean, particularly the Persian Gulf, has its source in 
misunderstandings of the events of the 1970s; that of a severe oil supply crisis in the 
1990s – and probably beyond. President Carter’s statement in his 1980 State of the Union 
address, subsequently labeled as the “Carter Doctrine,” that “Any attempt by any outside 
force to gain control of the Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the United States of America and such assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary including military force.”125  
As far as the United States is concerned, China has not replaced Russia as a 
significant global threat. China, nonetheless, is likely to be a major American foreign 
policy problem of the twenty-first century and the evidence suggests that China will 
probably be powerful enough to challenge America’s preferred order in Asia and may, 
indeed, wish to do so. A serious security situation may arise if China chooses to increase 
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its military presence on the pretext of protecting its interests linked with the port project. 
Pakistan, being the country housing this port, will have to convey the port’s “utility” 
terms in the most explicit way to dispel port’s military usage by any of the states. 
The Indian Ocean region has remained and will be an area of interest for the 
American policy makers. It is, however, a well recognized fact that the United States 
helps to “shape the environment” (in the words of the Pentagon’s quadrennial defense 
review) in various regions.126 Pakistan does need that help to ensure success of its port 
project. Notwithstanding internal dynamics, which are pushing policies, overall economic 
and strategic interests ought to drive the United States to foster cooperation amongst 
states of the region. The United States “assured” stabilization in the area will guarantee 
success of the Gwadar port project, and Islamabad needs to formulate policies that can 
attract such “assurance.” China, being an emerging power and largest stakeholder in the 
port project, has an equally important role; Chinese interests and intentions are therefore 
discussed in ensuing paragraphs. 
3. Chinese Interests 
China is an emerging global player with significant influence in the area as it is 
the only great power that is contiguous to South Asia. One estimate suggests that, with 
the present remarkable growth rate, it is expected to reach to the level of world’s largest 
economy of the United States by 2020.127 China’s desire to play an important role in the 
Indian Ocean stems from its historical association with the region and the presence of her 
vital sea trade routes in the area. Its long-term interests in the Indian Ocean are both 
economic and politico-strategic. Chinese government concerns about energy security in 
an oil import era, however, continue to dominate its strategic thinking.128  
According to Mearchiemer, if China becomes an economic powerhouse it will 
almost certainly translate its economic might into military might. Thus, Chinese military 
might will appear more dangerous to its neighbors and complicating America’s 
commitments in the region.129 As part of China’s revised doctrine of waging “modern 
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warfare under high technology conditions on the high seas,” the People’s Liberation 
Army Navy (PLAN) is developing a blue-water capability by 2015-20, centered around 
at least two aircraft carrier battle groups for the Indian and Pacific Oceans.130 The July 
1992 report of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Liberation Army 
outlined the plans for the expansion of Chinese naval capabilities through construction of 
three large bases by 1998, and called for stepped-up naval visits in the Indian Ocean and 
more frequent port calls to foreign countries in the region.131 
For China, South Asia, West Asia, Africa and even Europe through the Indian 
Ocean is closer than the U.S. West coast across the Pacific.132 At present, China is not in 
a position to interfere effectively in the Indian Ocean, yet owing to her growing navy and 
her interests she can exercise considerable influence in the region. In the present unipolar 
environment, China wants to take the role of a major participant in the establishment of a 
new type of world order. This cannot be achieved with having the Indian Ocean region 
out of her influence.133 Similarly, China also resents the hegemonic designs of India 
towards the Indian Ocean and has always exhibited her opposition to such Indian 
attempts. China also suspects India of supporting superpower presence in the Indian 
Ocean as a means of countering China. The most serious challenge is that the U.S. 
military presence in Central, South and South-East Asia may undermine Chinese 
influence in these regions and make it more difficult for China to achieve its security, 
economic and energy objectives in the future.134 
The Chinese are well aware of the geostrategic realities and have been engaged in 
diplomatic, economic and military activities to build a maritime infrastructure to 
safeguard their maritime interests.135 Present Chinese commitment to build-up 
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infrastructure is impressive as it is probably the start of long-term Chinese intent in the 
Indian Ocean. The same is also evident from her assistance for construction of the 
Gwadar Port at the northern most tip of the Indian Ocean. It would not be long before the 
Chinese Navy would make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean in support of its 
economic and maritime interests. China has already consolidated its access to the Indian 
Ocean through the Karakoram Highway and Karachi and Gwadar ports, through the 
China-Burma road to Burmese ports, and through the Malacca Straits. For China, the 
second stake holder in the Gwadar port project, the port offers a strategic toehold in the 
energy rich region of CARs and provides an alternative trade link to its western 
provinces. Xinjiang Province lies 4,500 kilometers from China’s east coast but just 2,500 
kilometers from Gwadar. This will make it possible for China to route some of its 
external trade through the Gwadar port. 
China’s growing military strength vis-à-vis her central geographic location and 
her desire to become a pre-eminent power in the region suggest that China has to play an 
important role in the future conflicts of the region. The regional balance and stability in 
South Asia and Pakistan’s healthy development are two major interests for China in 
addition to safeguarding her own interests. Chinese desire for an increased role in the 
area could seriously jeopardize if Islamabad chooses to consider any United State request 
for Maritime bases, particularly at Gwadar. 
International relations theorists suggest that as a nation becomes more prosperous 
and more integrated into the world economy, it will become more democratized and more 
anxious to preserve the world order that has made its prosperity possible. It is therefore 
envisaged that the Chinese would not venture into military presence on the name of safe 
guarding interests at the Gwadar Port and stir up a never-ending spiral of seriously 
destabilizing events. Pakistan will have to ensure appropriate policies to dispel any such 
contemplation by Beijing. 
Having discussed interests of both the United States and China, capable of stirring 
complexity of the strategic situation, this thesis will now turn to Iran, a probable 
economic competitor with regards to Gwadar Port, which has long been waiting 
opportunities to establish its dominant role in the region.  
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4. Iranian Interests  
The Persian Gulf is an important trade route in the strategic northern reaches of 
the Indian Ocean. Some 80 percent of the world’s oil tankers leave the shores of the 
Persian Gulf destined to other parts of the world.136 Geopolitical location of Iran within 
the Persian Gulf region is such that the northern shores of this Gulf belong entirely to 
Iran, which enables her to control the Straight of Hormuz. Passage through Hormuz is an 
issue of concern several times a year when Iran holds its war games at the mouth of 
Gulf.137 Iran regards her role in the Indian Ocean as an extension of her interests in the 
Gulf due to important geographical location at the mouth of Persian Gulf.  
Iran, too, is concerned with her economic interests associated with the Indian 
Ocean. Supply of natural gas to India, via a pipeline through the Indian Ocean, is one of 
Iran’s mega projects. Additionally, the Iranian port of Chahbahar, located on the mouth 
of Gulf, could become the hub of commercial activities if the natural resources of CAR 
find the way to rest of the world through this port. Iran’s situation with respect to its 
influence on the CARs and its desire to mend fences with the West suffers many 
impediments.  
Turkmenistan sees Iran as one of the export routes for both oil and gas; even 
many of the oil tycoons see it as a viable option but the United States is pushing hard for 
alternative routes.138 Washington advocates the construction of pipelines in several 
directions from the Caspian Region, explicitly excluding Iran.139 Although Iran has seen 
some investment from the EU (particularly France) and India, it largely remains isolated 
from the international monetary system. Its isolation thus enhances prospects of Gwadar 
port success. 
Historically, Iran had warm relations with Pakistan more often than not. Both 
countries being candidates of a transit route for CAR natural resources, as well as trade, 
may well eventually end up on an adversarial path. Additionally, increased Indian 
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influence in Iran is considered an attempt of “encircling” Pakistan. In this situation, 
Pakistan needs to initiate “positive engagement” with Iran to safeguard its interests in the 
area. 
Discussion of an economic competitor now leads to evaluating interests and 
intentions of India, another emerging power with growing economic interests and with 
whom Pakistan’s relations have mostly remained of animosity: India.  
5. Indian Interests 
India is perhaps the only country on the Indian Ocean that has the economic 
potential, military strength and the political will to dominate this vast expanse of 
water.140 Indian leaders and strategists have traditionally viewed the Indian Ocean region 
as a sort of Indian security zone, very loosely akin to the way Americans have viewed 
Central America and the Caribbean; or the way Russians have viewed Poland; or the way 
Chinese have viewed Korea. Although Indian leaders have not explicitly laid out such a 
regional doctrine, Indian behavior in the Indian Ocean has generally conformed to such 
and implicit doctrine.141 
India’s dominant physical features and geographical location in the Indian Ocean 
indicate its dependence on the sea for both prosperity and security. India does not have 
any significant land access to the rest of world. Hostility with Pakistan and a difficult 
geography that separates India from China and Burma dictates that over 97 percent of 
India’s trade is done through the Indian Ocean; therefore, India has critical interests in 
maintaining the seas be open. India depends, to a large extent, on the import of crude oil 
and petroleum products for meeting its energy requirements from the Persian Gulf region. 
India’s production from existing oil fields has been declining over the time, increasing its 
dependence on the import of oil.142 And imported oil meets about 60 percent of the 
Indian petroleum requirements.143 India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas 
predicts the country’s demand for petroleum products will jump to 155.3 million metric 
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tons/year (3.106 million barrels per day) by fiscal year 2006-07.144 To meet additional 
energy requirements, India seeks to develop economic relation with CARs in 
collaboration with Iran and desires to have access in this market. For this reason, since 
the 1990s, Central Asia has come to represent India’s extended neighborhood. For India, 
Caspian energy supplies have a critical strategic drawback in that they must transit 
Pakistan, with whom relations are continually strained over the disputed territory of 
Kashmir.145 
Indian strategic doctrine revolves around the protection of its maritime 
resources/assets, such as offshore oil platforms/rigs and sea-lanes of communication, to 
ensure smooth flow of trade.146 There are up to 30 Indian ships at sea in Indian waters at 
any given time and a much larger number of ships of other nations engaged in trade to 
and from Indian ports,147 in addition to 8-10 tankers carrying crude oil to India daily.148 
India is working on the strategy of building up a viable maritime force to deter any 
potential aggressor and to protect her SLOCs. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in his book The 
Paradox of American Power, writes that India’s military capabilities are impressive in 
South Asia but not in the larger Asian context.149 However, its strategic interests extend 
way beyond that and tend to enter the domain of regional hegemon, which dictates her 
relations with other countries.  
India’s relations with other countries have so far been driven by security dictates 
more than economic compulsions. Its historically estranged relations with Pakistan do not 
require much discussion, as both countries already have fought three wars and more than 
half a dozen incidents short of war. The regional power balance vis-à-vis Pakistan has 
largely determined India’s relations with Afghanistan since 1979. Broadly, India has two 
 
144 Mohan Malhotra, 1997. 
145 “The Geo-Politics of Caspian Oil,” The Janes Intelligence Review, (July 01, 2000). 
146 Manooj Joshi, “Indian Navy Interests and Trends”, Indian Ocean Security and Stability in the 
Post-Cold war Era, (1995): 172. 
147 Brahma Chellaney ed., Securing India’s Future in the new millennium (New Delhi: Orient 
Longman Ltd, 1999). 126. 
148 Brahma Chellaney, 126. 
149 Joseph s. Nye Jr, 29. 
56 
                                                
principle foreign policy objectives when dealing with Afghanistan: to counter Pakistani 
expansion into West Asia, and use Afghanistan as an access route to Central Asia.150  
In the late 1990s, the United States began to tilt toward India, as Washington and 
New Delhi turned from ‘estranged democracies’ of the Cold War to ‘engaged 
democracies’ in the post-Cold War era.151 U.S. officials consider strategically engaging 
India as a "future investment," particularly since the Middle East could become hostile 
and dangerous to continuing U.S. military presence in the region. If Washington's 
relationships with its traditional allies - Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia - become 
more fragile, India will emerge as a critical component of U.S. strategy.  
When its relations with China come up, the Indian security community feels that 
extension of Chinese interests to the South Asian portion of the Indian Ocean is 
potentially harmful for India.152 India even attributed 1998 nuclear explosions towards its 
security concern from China. Defense economists, however, estimate that if India 
continues to spend 4 percent of GNP on defense, in fifteen years its military capital stock 
would reach $314 billion, or 62 percent of China’s (compared with 48 percent today).153 
These figures indicate maintenance of parity amongst both countries, leaving Pakistan 
and other Indian neighbors to deal with Indian military might, if they choose to “catch 
up” to China. There are, however, reasons to be optimistic since Indian policy seems to 
be shifting from pure security orientation to economic concerns. Even this shift has the 
potential to prove a significant factor for resolving outstanding issues with neighboring 
countries. Pakistan needs to seize this opportunity to normalize its relations with India 
and reasonable progress is already underway in shape of “composite dialogue.”  
India’s increasing interest in Afghanistan, however, is raising concerns in 
Islamabad. When Gwadar port is put in operation, Afghanistan will be one of the direct 
beneficiaries by accessing it for its trade as well as getting royalties when the gas/oil 
 
150 “External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – South Asia (2002).   
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National Defense University Press, 1992), 34.  
152 Sanjay Chaturvedi, “Common Security? Geopolitics, Development, South Asia and the Indian 
Ocean,” Third World Quarterly, Vol 19, No 4, (1998): 716.  
153 RAND, Asian Economic Trends and Their Security Implications, 
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pipeline is materialized. Afghanistan’s strategic situation and its interests in the area in 
general and the Gwadar port in particular are discussed below.  
6. Afghanistan’s Interest 
Afghanistan has historically remained the center of contention between major 
powers. History knows one such struggle for mastery in Central Asia by Russia and Great 
Britain resulting in “the Great Game.”154 Russia again ventured into Afghanistan towards 
last decades of 20th century, attracting U.S. attention that was looking for suitable 
opportunity to undo some of the unpleasant memories of Vietnam. This Russian venture 
ended when, at Politburo meeting on November 13, 1986, the Soviet leaders decided to 
withdraw troops from Afghanistan by the end of 1988,155 resulting in the culmination of 
the Cold War. Hopes of building war torn Afghanistan faded sooner than expected due to 
internal strife of warlords. The Taliban then came along to fill the leadership gap; they 
also could not survive long due to United States outrage over the handover of “so called” 
terrorists after incident of September 11, 2001. Afghanistan is currently in a state of war 
and nation building, and it is too soon to foresee how things will settle in the long run.156 
Afghanistan lacks a functional economy of any significance. Its agrarian based 
subsistence economy is not even meeting the basic food requirements of Afghans, forcing 
the population to survive on foreign donated food. The donors that participated in the 
Tokyo Conference of January 2002 pledged over U.S. $4.5 billion to Afghanistan over 
five years. The World Bank has estimated that requirement of a fund for addressing basic 
Afghan problems to be around U.S. $10.2 billion over five years. Based on two years of 
reconstruction experience, in July 2003, Care International estimated the requirement of 
funds to be between U.S. $15-30 billion over a five-year period.157 So far only a fraction 
of   funds  have actually  been  made available, but whenever reconstruction activities get  
 
154 Daniel Moran, 230. 
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momentum, Pakistan, by virtue of its geographical position, will have to play an 
important role and the Gwadar port stands bright chances of an active role in the entire 
reconstruction exercise. 
Amongst other projects, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline 
was a hope to help revive the Afghan economy. The TAP pipeline project would have 
proven to be a jackpot for the people of Afghanistan as the project could bring in over 
$300 million as royalty to the country.158 The inflow of this cash and foreign investments 
could help in stabilizing the country’s economy and in reconstructing its infrastructure. It 
can be argued that a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan will be conducive to the involvement 
of a U.S. firm in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline.159 Afghan transit trade 
was earlier handled through the Karachi port, and after operationalization the Gwadar 
port will handle it. Afghan Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani also offered his country’s 
support for development of the Gwadar port, saying it would act as a gateway to 
prosperity for the entire region.160 Pakistan needs to keep Afghanistan engaged to 
facilitate the smooth and economical running of the port. 
Discussion of the interests of various states in the Gwadar port with tremendous 
economic prospects would not be complete if interests of Japan and the European Union 
are not evaluated. Although both entities do not have any significant political or security 
interests in the area, their economic interests demand appropriate mention.  
7. Japanese Interests 
The importance of the Indian Ocean to the Japanese cannot be exaggerated; it 
would not be wrong to state that the Indian Ocean is a lifeline of Japan. Japan averaged 
3.9 million bbl/d of net oil imports from the Persian Gulf during 2002.161 The need to 
protect her economic interest may one day invoke deeper involvement of her “Self 
Defense Maritime Forces.”162 Japan presently relies on the forces of the United States 
and other Western powers for her protection. Japan has no worthwhile political goal in 
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this region and, with over dependence on this region for raw material and oil, the 
Japanese have always desired peace here. Japan’s energy concerns dictate its policies in 
favor of oil from a Caspian export pipeline terminating at the Indian Ocean.163 Therefore, 
it is safe to assume that Japan will support the operationalization of the Gwadar port 
project.  
In addition to the United States, Japan will be the most worried nation with 
increased presence of the Chinese at the helm of the routes to her vital energy resources. 
Recent economic collaboration, though, has helped both nations to leave their bitter past 
experience behind. Divergence in interest in the Indian Ocean may strain their 
relationship. Pakistan will have to “reassure” Japan to alleviate any suspicions of port 
utility harmful to Japanese interests.  
8. European Union Interests 
Western Europe averaged 2.3 million bbl/d of oil imports from the Persian Gulf 
during 2002.164 EU members possess only about 0.6 percent of the world’s proven 
reserves of oil and 2.0 percent of the world’s natural gas, and it is estimated that two-
thirds of the EU’s total energy requirements will be imported by 2020.165 The EU is, 
therefore, heavily dependent on oil transiting through the Indian Ocean. By and large 
their policy towards the Indian Ocean region has been one of reconciliation and 
resolution of security issues through the use of “soft power.”166 Their dependence on oil, 
so called guarded by the U.S., has not encouraged them to seek an active role in problems 
of either the Middle East or South Asia. 
Nevertheless, a strong realization exists amongst European nations to have 
strategic alternate oil resources reducing their vulnerability to a single area source. Like 
all others, CARs attracted the EU’s attention for which the EU strongly supports an oil 
and gas pipeline from CARs to the EU through Turkey. The pipeline route to European 
markets through Georgia and Turkey faces geopolitical turmoil and tough hurdles in its 
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realization and actual execution. Separatist tensions in Georgia, instability in the Kurdish 
areas of Turkey, and unrest over Cyprus near the Mediterranean Turkish port of Ceyhan 
are some of the problems.167 In this scenario, the EU is likely to support a pipeline to the 
Indian Ocean either through Iran or Pakistan. There is negligible evidence of drags in EU 
relations with states that matter to the Gwadar port project. The EU and China have 
developed a stable relationship over the last decade, and so far they do not seem worried 
about Chinese presence in Indian Ocean. 
D. CONCLUSION  
The above discussion clearly manifests that strategic interests of all nations 
necessarily stem from the economic interests. Gwadar, with potential to act as a hub port, 
can facilitate convergence of interests of all states, bringing peace and prosperity in the 
area. Today, the entire globe is focused on the Middle East and Asia with the primary 
concern of protecting economic interests in the form of a free flow of oil from the Persian 
Gulf region, as well as tapping the natural resources of the Central Asian Republics. 
Friedman puts forward “the Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention”, arguing that 
economic globalization had made interstate war nearly impossible.168 Others admit that 
in today’s world chances of cooperation through economic integration are more than ever 
in the history of mankind. But the political, economic and military importance of the 
Indian Ocean has turned it into a major theatre of rivalries. The power politics of littoral 
states is, of course, as threatening to peace as coveting influence and protecting interests 
through power projection capabilities by the external powers. 
The United States, as a unipolar power, ought to play an important role in keeping 
the situation stable in the Indian Ocean. One hopes that Krauthammer’s fears on United 
States failure to do enough resulting in instability of the area do not materialize.169 
Though it might also be possible for the United States to do too much and provoke 
balancing against it, which would also result in instability. Its role in promoting 
liberalism is also appreciable so far as it is not stigmatized as imperialist. China and the 
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United States may not necessarily be adversaries, but rather once again use Gwadar as a 
platform to promote economic well being of the area; after all, similar understanding in 
relations of both nations with respect to Pakistan had worked earlier as well. 170 It cannot 
be overlooked that China has never lost an opportunity to cultivate U.S. goodwill.171 
India’s ambitions of economic prosperity with over a billion people is justifiable, but not 
for a role as a regional hegemon. 
South Asia has had enough of its share of turbulence without realizing that 
respective economies may receive a crippling blow by a serious armed conflict and set 
the clock back years or even decades.172 Delhi needs to appreciate that United States and 
Chinese interests in their mutual relationship far outweigh the interests of each vis-à-vis 
India, and both have high economic stakes in the Indian Ocean.173 The lesson for all 
nations contiguous to Pakistan (with respect to the Gwadar port) is that unbalanced 
power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to others.174 Whereas, the emerging 
geopolitical environment in the region has led Pakistan to stand again as a strategic front 
line state for the interests of Extra Regional Powers, safeguarding of its economic 
interests clearly manifests from present government policies. Pakistan needs to adopt a 
balanced approach to ensuring stability, security and cooperation rather than conflict and 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Once a small fishing town along the Makran Coast, Gwadar is poised to become a 
mega seaport which will fulfill the requirement of four geographically important regions: 
South Asia, West China, Central Asia, and Afghanistan. The decision to build a port at 
Gwadar came in the backdrop of increased domestic trade and the world’s growing 
requirements of alternate energy resources. The Gwadar port is strategically located at the 
cross roads of natural resources of the Middle East and Central Asia, a huge consumer 
market of Asia with over one third of world population, and at the shortest route to 
southern provinces of China. It has the potential to bring about significant economic, 
demographic and political changes for Pakistan in particular, and the entire area in 
general.  
Historically, civilizations have emerged and developed on the shores of the seas 
and oceans. The role and importance of the oceans in the development of human society 
cannot be overemphasized as the majority of the world’s major cities and urban 
populations lie within 200 km of a coastline.175 And from times immemorial, sea-faring 
nations have always been prosperous and economically stronger than others. Seaports 
serve as the termination point of the great ocean highways that have been used for trade 
and commerce for centuries. They play an important role in strengthening the national 
economy and contribute significantly towards the prosperity of countries. 
B. MAJOR FINDINGS 
The thesis starts with a vision for Gwadar to be a link between East and West that 
will change the fate of this region as well as the national economy. The port will usher 
Pakistan into a new era of socio-economic development. The interpolation of trade 
expected to flow through the Gwadar port suggests that the port can generate enormous 
revenues, provided economic and foreign policy options are handled properly.  
Chapters II and III conclude that the Gwadar port has the potential to handle not 
only domestic trade but also act as a transshipment port, which besides boosting trade 
 
175 Sam J Tangredi, 4. 
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volume, generates additional revenue just by handling some one else’s trade. Worldwide 
demand of natural resources is increasing at an unprecedented ratio, as is the requirement 
of shipping terminals to handle this demand. Gwadar port will be able to attract its share 
of trade for cargo and natural resources. 
Although there is an enormous quantum of trade that could flow through the 
Gwadar port, it is also faced with the tough and challenging task of competing with 
developed ports of the region. Concerted efforts are required for creating a conducive 
environment for industrialization of this region based on strategies, program and 
scientific approach, and efficient directions to make it a comprehensive and competitive 
project. After synthesis of economic incentive packages and management policies of 
various ports and industrial zones around the world, particularly of Asian Tigers, a set of 
policy guidelines has been evolved for the consideration of officials handling the Gwadar 
port affairs. It is emphasized that some elements of these proposals require a radical 
departure from Pakistan’s traditional economic and trade polices, and a white paper in 
this regard is considered an appropriate tool to convey consolidated government polices. 
The emerging political and economic pattern of the Indian Ocean region is 
considered the pivot of world affairs due to its extraordinary potential for natural 
resources and trade routes vital to the entire world. Chapter IV concludes that Pakistan is 
in the middle of a complex strategic and security situation. The GWOT, lack of thaw 
between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan’s delicate internal political situation are some 
of the facets affecting Gwadar port, and they demand careful handling by Islamabad.  
The United States and key regional players are likely to view Chinese 
involvement in the Gwadar port project with suspicion. Any potential Chinese long-term 
military presence in the region will pose complications for Pakistan. The United States 
may request military basing rights at the Gwadar port to handle some future turbulent 
situation in the region. Any such eventuality would require Pakistan to strike a difficult 
balance between a time-tested friend and an ally. Pakistan must enunciate a policy of 
non-military use for foreign powers of the Gwadar port to help stimulate Pakistan’s 
economic revival. 
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Although there are plenty of theories that establish the link of foreign policies 
with the economic dynamics of a country, the following Decalogue was chosen to 
establish this link and to propose recommendations based on findings of the thesis:176  
 
1. Gwadar Port can generate necessary resources for the economic revival of 
Pakistan. 
2. But no stability, no economic revival. 
3. No growth, no stability. 
4. No resources, no growth. 
5. No infrastructure, no resources. 
6. No money, no infrastructure.  
7. No rules, no money. 
8. No security, no rules. 
9. No broad based cooperation amongst regional and extra regional powers, no 
security. 




A consolidated white paper is recommended, which should include all economic 
and administrative aspects of the port and its ancillary projects. Salient features of 
recommended white paper are:  
• Constitute a sovereign board of governors, having government and private sector 
representation, to handle policy matters of the port as well as the establishment of 
business and industry at Gwadar city.  
• Port operations should be operated through private enterprise (Landlord port 
concept). 
• Establishment of Special Economic and Export Processing Zones. 
• 100 percent foreign ownership of industries and services, including land. 
• No import/export taxes. 
 
176 Barnett used the Decalogue for Asian energy future; here it is presented with little modification to 
suit port’s maritime aspects. For details see Thomas P.M. Barnett, “Asia’s Energy Future: The Military-
Market Link,” in  Globalization and Maritime Power, ed. Sam J Tangredi, 191.  
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• Unlimited transfer of capital and profits in foreign currency. 
• No corporate taxation for a minimum of 15-20 years. 
• No personal income tax. 
• Abundant inexpensive energy. 
• Provision of air/road/rail linkages. 
• Cost-effective and skilled labor force. 
• High-level technical and administrative support. 
• Minimal government intervention, however, full security of the investment.  
• Arrangements of Security and Safety. 
2. Foreign Policy  
The prime objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to develop beneficial and 
strong ties with all major powers and maintain cordial relations with its neighbors.177 
Keeping the “efforts” point of the above mentioned Decalogue and declared foreign 
policy objectives, the government of Pakistan needs to initiate extensive efforts to foster 
cooperation amongst all players and formulate policies to attract reciprocal cooperation 
of competing nations, to “reassure” them of benign aspects of this port project and dispel 
notions of military use of the port by any foreign power. Pakistan needs to reassure India 
and Afghanistan through demonstration of “restraint” and “irrevocable commitment.” 
Iran could be won over with explicit declarations and through establishing “norms of 
competition.” As far as the United States and China are concerned, both are required to 
show restraint that could be in the shape of some strategic understanding or even through 
entering into a “limited security regime.”  
 
177 Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Foreign Policy, Hhttp://www.pakistan.gov.pk/foreignaffaris-
division/policies/pak-fpolicy/pak-fpolicy.jspH (accessed March 6, 2005).  
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